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ABSTRACT 
Historically, policymakers have had difficulty addressing issues raised by 
emerging technologies. Whether it is inadequate legislation due to a general lack of 
awareness, or overregulation from a perceived threat, emerging technologies seem to 
repeatedly confuse those responsible for ensuring their safe incorporation into society. 
Despite decades of experience with similar issues, this trend continues to this day. What 
lessons can be drawn from different approaches to policy development for other 
emerging technologies to help policymakers avoid these failures for additive 
manufacturing technologies?   
A structured focus comparison of three emerging technologies, unmanned aerial 
systems, autonomous vehicles, and additive manufacturing, revealed characteristics of 
emerging technologies—such as a low price point for market entry and rapid evolution—
that tend to surprise policymakers.  
This thesis recommends organizations make a concerted effort to engage early 
and often in the policy development process, and that they carefully consider each 
stakeholder’s level of involvement. It is also recommended that the Department of 
Homeland Security leverage existing mechanisms, such as the Centers of Excellence 
partnerships and the Strategic Foresight Initiative, to engage nontraditional partners in 
addressing issues raised by additive manufacturing technologies. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The relationship between public policy and emerging technologies has often been 
viewed as incompatible. In some ways, this view is in fact, accurate. Historically, 
governments faced with the complexity and ambiguity of an emerging technology, have 
applied regulatory mechanisms to contain or control the technology’s potentially 
nefarious uses. Conversely, however, some governments have used various tools within 
their control to support and promote innovation, ultimately resulting in new technologies. 
These historical examples also illustrate how the policy development approaches taken 
by legislative bodies can significantly impact emerging technologies’ trajectories. So 
what can policymakers learn from the successes and failures of historical, technology-
focused legislation to help them develop an informed approach to future emerging 
technology concerns?  
The primary focus of this project is answering that question for one of today’s 
most popular emerging technologies: the 3D printer.   
To appropriately address the question, this research used a structured, focused 
comparison to examine select elements of unmanned aerial systems (UASs), autonomous 
vehicles, and additive manufacturing systems. These technologies were selected based on 
availability of academic research as well as pertinence in the field of homeland security. 
To strengthen the approach to this qualitative study, the methodology focused on 
reducing the number of variables considered in each selected technology, and choosing 
emerging technologies that possessed similar conditions.  
This research revealed that the unique, individual characteristics of each emerging 
technology are the most significant factors that can lead to uninformed or reactionary 
public policy approaches. The most significant characteristics revealed by this study 
were: 
• timeframe for evolution of technology 
• price point for entry into the market 
• range of impacted stakeholders  
 xvi 
This researched showed that quickly evolving technologies with low price points 
for entry into the market and wide ranges of interested or impacted stakeholders are the 
most likely to surprise legislators. UASs and additive manufacturing technologies fit this 
description and, to date, have not been adequately addressed by policymakers. 
From these findings, the researcher developed recommendations at two levels: 
strategic and tactical. The strategic-level recommendations focus on general lessons 
learned from historical policy development examples focused on emerging technologies. 
These are high level, generalizable, and suitable for any organization interested in 
working with emerging technologies. The tactical-level recommendations are focused on 
existing mechanisms within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that can be 
leveraged to specifically address potential policy questions raised by the recent 
advancements in additive manufacturing processes. These recommendations aim to be 
realistic and executable, with consideration given to the continued strain on resources 
available for new initiatives.   
(1) Strategic Recommendations 
• Organizations should engage with stakeholders early and often in the 
policy development process. 
• Organizations should take a deliberate approach to engaging with non-
traditional stakeholders. 
• Organizations should promote an environment in which policy 
entrepreneurs can test various potential policy solutions prior to 
implementation.  
(2) Tactical Recommendations 
• The Department of Homeland Security should leverage existing 
mechanisms to further examine the potential policy implications of 
advancements in additive manufacturing technologies. 
• DHS Science and Technology Directorate should utilize its Centers of 
Excellence network to engage academia in research involving the nexus 
between homeland security and additive manufacturing. 
 xvii 
• The Federal Emergency Management Association should address the 
potential implications of additive manufacturing and other emerging 
technologies in its Strategic Foresight Initiative. 
This research is not only limited to the previously identified technologies, but also 
to the current state of policy development. As these technologies mature and more 
academic literature becomes available, future research could analyze a larger number of 
technologies and a more expansive subset of examined elements. As new policies are 
developed and implemented addressing not only additive manufacturing but other 
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A quick Internet search for bad public policy examples will almost immediately, 
depending on one’s Internet speed, result in hundreds of thousands of hits. Popular results 
include the 18th Amendment in 1917, prohibiting the manufacturing, transportation, and 
sale of intoxicating liquors, and the 2009 Car Allowance Rebate System, more commonly 
referred to as “Cash for Clunkers.” But what public policy characteristics separate the bad 
from good?  
For the purpose of this paper, a bad public policy is an uninformed policy created 
to address one public concern, but which unintentionally creates several others.1 In his 
Boston Globe column, John E. Sununu observes this can occur when policymakers “focus 
on the kind of vague simplicity that has great political appeal but tends to disintegrate as 
soon as it comes into contact with the real world.”2 Often, this focus on the vague 
simplicity becomes more apparent when legislators attempt to address complex issues 
pertaining to emerging technology. As the following narrative illustrates, a popular 
emerging technology, the personal 3D printer, is already poised to confound 
policymakers unaware of its complexities and its potential. 
A. BACKGROUND: CODY WILSON’S STORY 
On an uncharacteristically mild Texas day in May 2013, a young man standing 
amid dry desert dirt and a few small clumps of grass stares intently at an unknown object 
in the distance. He is of average height and build and nothing about his dress is 
particularly striking; he wears blue jeans, a plain black polo, and a brown ball cap. After 
a few seconds of motionless focus, he glances over to a video camera to ensure its 
operator is set. He makes a few small adjustments to his sunglasses, leans forward, raises 
                                                 
1 “Prohibition,” History.com, accessed July 6, 2015, http://www.history.com/topics/prohibition; Ted 
Gayer and Emily Parker, “Cash for Clunkers: An Evaluation of the Car Allowance Rebate System,” 
Brookings Economic Studies, October 31, 2013 http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/10/cash-
for-clunkers-evaluation-gayer. 
2 John E. Sununu, “Cash for Clunkers: How Bad Public Policy gets Made,” Boston Globe, September 
1, 2014, https://www.bostonglobe.com.  
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his arms, and, with a muffled “pop,” fires what appears to be an oddly shaped toy gun.3 
This young man’s name is Cody Wilson. The gun he just fired, nicknamed the Liberator, 
is no toy, and the results of his initial test just solidified his position on Wired Magazine’s 
list of the 15 Most Dangerous People in the World.4 
While Cody Wilson’s complete biography is not critical for the purposes of this 
paper, his background and ideological perspectives offer helpful insight into the heated 
public debate surrounding his use of an emerging technology. 
Cody Wilson was born in January 1988 in Little Rock, Arkansas to parents that he 
described as, “your mainstream Arkansan conservative types.”5 “It wasn’t until college,” 
said, “that I went ahead and said: ‘You know what? I’m an anarchist.’ I’ve always been 
on the Internet, but basically my zeal for the Internet and my anarchist tendencies all kind 
of cross-pollinated. I discovered crypto-anarchy and the cypherpunks and Internet 
radicalism.”6  
It was also during his time at the University of Central Arkansas that Wilson 
would meet and befriend many individuals who would help him establish Defense 
Distributed— the company credited for developing the first shareable blueprint for a 3D-
printed weapon. In a video posted on YouTube, Wilson attempts to explain the 
company’s initial goals: 
A group of friends and I have decided to band together under a collective 
name. We’re not a company, we’re not a corporation, we’re not even a 
business association of any kind. We just call ourselves Defense 
Distributed. We want to share with you an idea. This idea is not original. 
This idea has been had before. But it’s an idea whose time has come. We 
think we have a way to get there. The Defense Distributed project has 
                                                 
3 “Liberator—The Dawn of Wiki-Weapons,” YouTube video, 0:52, posted By “Defense Distributed,” 
May 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=drPz6n6UXQY.  
4 Robert Beckhusen, “The 15 Most Dangerous People in the World,” Wired, December 19, 2012, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/liberator-gun-made-with-3d-printer-fires-first-successful-shot/  
5 “Cody Wilson: Troll, Genius, Patriot, Provocateur, Anarchist, Attention Whore, Gun Nut or Second 





developed an idea we’re calling the Wiki Weapon. It would be the world’s 
first 3D-printable personal defense system.7 
Defense Distributed did not immediately set out to create a complete and fully 
functional 3D-printable gun, but instead focused on creating individual firearm 
components that could be attached to weapons created through standard manufacturing 
techniques. The component that drew the most attention in the media was a plastic 
receiver for the AR15—a category of semi-automatic assault rifle that is owned by 
millions of private civilians in the United States.8 The receiver is the particular section of 
the rifle that contains the serial number—the only way a firearm can be traced by the 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives’ (ATF) National Tracing Center.9 
By developing the blueprints for a receiver that could be manufactured privately and 
without a serial number, Defense Distributed essentially eliminated the primary 
mechanism for the federal government to trace specific types of assault rifles. 
While Defense Distributed was perfecting its design for the AR15 receiver, Adam 
Lanza used the same style weapon in his deadly assault on the Sandy Hook elementary 
school in Newtown, Connecticut.10 The tragedy, which claimed the lives of 20 students 
and six adults, quickly spurred Congress into action. In January 2013, New York 
Governor Andrew Cuomo signed into law the New York Secure Ammunition and 
Firearms Enforcement (SAFE) Act, which, among other things, placed a ban on high-
capacity magazines and assault weapons.11 Defense Distributed, in response, released 
several free plans for printable high-capacity magazines. These plans included a 
                                                 
7 “Cody Wilson,” Arkansas Times. 
8 William J. Krouse, Gun Control Legislation (CRS Report No. RL32842) (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2012), 8. 
9 “National Tracing Center,” Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, last modified 
June 19, 2015, https://www.atf.gov/content/firearms/firearms-enforcement/national-tracing-center. 
10 “Sandy Hook Shooting: What Happened?” CNN, accessed April 17, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/ 
interactive/2012/12/us/sandy-hook-timeline/. 
11 Andrew Cuomo, “Governor Cuomo Signs Groundbreaking Legislation That Will Give New York 




magazine for the AR15 nicknamed the “Cuomo” and another for the AK47 dubbed the 
“Feinstein” after vocal gun control advocates in Congress.12 
Only three months after the New York SAFE Act was signed into law, a New 
York Congressman attempted to specifically address the issue of 3D printed guns via 
legislation. In April 2013, Congressman Steve Israel introduced a bill that sought to 
overhaul the then-current Undetectable Firearms Act (UFA) of 1988. The revisions, 
which required permanent metal pieces inside all firearms, specifically targeted 3D 
printed guns, which are known for having removable metal inside their grips just large 
enough to be identified by metal detectors.13 The proposed provisions to the UFA 
addressing concerns related to 3D printed guns were not passed; the then-current UFA 
was simply extended another ten years.14   
It was in the midst of this political focus on gun control that Defense Distributed 
turned its attention to developing a fully-functional 3D printed weapon, Cody Wilson’s 
famed Liberator. By May 2013, the company had posted a YouTube video of Wilson 
successfully test-firing the weapon. This was a pivotal moment for the company, and its 
founders knew it. In an interview, Wilson noted, “At the end of the day, we realized the 
political reality, which is that this is something that at least the current administration 
doesn’t want to happen. They have a real antipathy for it. So at any opportunity, if you 
messed up, that’s a point of criminal investigation or prosecution.”15 
After the successful test of the Liberator, Defense Distributed released the 
computer-aided design (CAD) file for the weapon via the Internet. Within a week, the 
State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) requested that these 
files, along with others closely associated with Defense Distributed, be taken down. The 
DDTC claimed the technology could be used to violate laws regarding the international 
                                                 
12 “Cody Wilson,” Arkansas Times. 
13 Derek Mead, “Congress’s Plastic Gun Ban Left a 3D-Printed Loophole,” Motherboard, December 
10, 2013, http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/congresss-plastic-gun-ban-left-a-3d-printed-loophole. 
14 Burgess Everett, “Senate Passes Legislation on Undetectable Guns,” Politico, December 9, 2013, 
http://www.politico.com. 
15 “Cody Wilson,” Arkansas Times. 
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export of approved firearms.16 Fearing serious prosecution, Wilson complied, but not 
before the file for the Liberator was downloaded over 100,000 times.17 
The media’s reactions to Defense Distributed’s actions and to the Liberator have 
been varied. Computerworld Magazine claims to have tested the Liberator and concluded 
the devices were “far more dangerous for the shooter than the intended target.”18 
Conversely, Daily Mail reported that 3D weapons, once basic and unreliable, are now 
“deadly.”19 The political response has not been much different. Democrats tend to 
support stricter gun laws and, as such, have been strong opponents of 3D printed guns. At 
a press conference announcing a measure to make 3D printed guns illegal, Senator 
Charles Schumer stated, “A terrorist, someone who’s mentally ill, a spousal abuser, a 
felon can essentially open a gun factory in their garage.”20 On the contrary, it was 
pressure from the National Rifle Association (NRA) and members of the Republican 
Party that helped strike down the addition of stricter language in the UFA in 2013.21 
While the debate surrounding 3D printed guns has received both media and 
political attention, there is a related debate currently underway that has much larger 
implications: the government’s role in 3D printing as an emerging technology and as an 
established industry. Vocal individuals on many sides of the issue are arriving at 
conclusions and presenting potential recommendations based on misconceptions about 
current (and potential future) technological capabilities of 3D printing. Cody Wilson’s 
                                                 
16 Michael Molitch-Hou, “Defense Distributed Sues State Department for Freedom of 3D Printable 
Gun Speech,” 3D Printing Industry, May 7, 2015, http://3dprintingindustry.com/2015/05/07/defense-
distributed-sues-state-department-for-freedom-of-3d-printable-gun-speech/. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Lucas Mearian, “Lab Tests Show 3D Printed Guns Can Be Useless—and Dangerous,” 
Computerworld, May 30, 2014, http://www.computerworld.com/article/2490074/emerging-technology/lab-
tests-show-3d-printed-guns-can-be-useless----and-dangerous.html. 
19 Jonathan O’Callaghan, “The Terrifying Reality of 3D-Printed Guns: Devices that Anyone Can 
Make are Quickly Evolving into Deadly Weapons,” Daily Mail, May 16, 2014,  
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2630473/The-terrifying-reality-3D-printed-guns-Devices-
ANYONE-make-quickly-evolving-deadly-weapons.html.  
20 “Schumer Announces Support For Measure To Make 3D Printed Guns Illegal,” CBS New York, 




story exemplifies how an underappreciated emerging technology combined with 
misinformation can lead to uninformed policy. What the vast majority of media reports 
and political oratory are missing is an unbiased analysis of the pertinent technologies and 
the potential implications for the various stakeholders who must decide the fate of these 
technologies in the United States. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Advancements and access to emerging technologies, including additive 
manufacturing, over the last five years have many experts believing the world is about to 
witness the start of another industrial revolution.22 The relative ease with which complex 
designs are created, along with the continued decline in manufacturing costs associated 
with this technology, has convinced these same experts that, in the near future, 
individuals will be producing many of their basic needs from the privacy of their own 
home. Whether or not these predictions come to fruition, it is apparent that the recent 
advancements in additive manufacturing technologies have serious policy implications 
across multiple industries. Copyright and intellectual property rights concerns have been 
at the forefront of these discussions, but high-profile stories involving the development 
and release of plans for non-metallic weaponry have attracted the attention of 
policymakers—especially in the United States.  
As policymakers slowly gain an appreciation for this technology’s legislative 
complexities, the technology itself is advancing faster than the rulemaking process. While 
lawmakers consider the implications of a single-shot, plastic gun developed by a few 
individuals fresh out of college, research firms and universities are getting closer to bio-
printing human organs.23 Gartner, a research center focused on global technology issues, 
has been heavily involved in additive manufacturing research over the last five years. 
One of Gartner’s research directors, Pete Basiliere noted, “Most of the [bioprinting] 
                                                 
22 Aaron Council and Michael Petch, 3D Printing: The Rise of the 3rd Industrial Revolution, 
Gyges3d.com: Kindle Edition, 2014. 
23 Mary-Ann Russon, “3D Printers Could be Banned by 2016 for Bioprinting Human Organs,” 
International Business Times, January 29, 2014, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/3d-printers-could-be-banned-by-
2016-bioprinting-human-organs-1434221.  
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research is being done in universities and start-ups. It’s not really ready for the big time 
yet and in some cases, the research is far ahead of government agency approval.”24 This 
scenario is not new. As this paper illustrates, other emerging technologies, such as 
unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and autonomous vehicles, have caught policymakers by 
surprise in the past, as others no doubt will in the future. Legislators are often scrambling 
to quickly address the most immediate issues, which leaves little or no time to identify 
lessons learned and best practices to help government leaders better prepare for the next 
emerging technology. This type of reflection needs to occur; inadequate or misinformed 
public policy could have serious security and economic impacts on the future 
proliferation of an emerging technology such as additive manufacturing. In an attempt to 
address these concerns, this research seeks to answer a few important questions. 
(1) Primary Research Question 
What lessons can the United States government learn from the emergence of 
unmanned aerial systems and autonomous vehicles to better prepare a more-informed 
public policy to accompany new additive manufacturing technologies? 
(2) Secondary Research Questions 
What are the barriers to the development of informed public policy pertaining to 
emerging technologies? What processes can be utilized to help policymakers and the 
public better understand the implications of policy in emerging technologies? 
C. SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FIELD 
This necessary research will help stakeholders understand how public policy 
impacts and shapes the trajectory of emerging technologies. Homeland security 
practitioners are in a somewhat unique position; they are often at the forefront of 
emerging technologies, tasked to incorporate new tools into their daily missions, but also 
expected to protect the public from the misuse of these same technologies. The homeland 
security practitioner’s central missions are based on the rule of law. Inadequate or 
                                                 
24 Ibid. 
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nonexistent policies pertaining to these emerging technologies not only impact the 
mission effectiveness, but can also endanger the lives of both the practitioner and the 
public. As the rate of technological adoption continues to accelerate, it will become 
increasingly important for policymakers to identify processes by which they can better 
address the ever-evolving homeland security concerns created by emerging technologies. 
D. METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS 
This research uses a structured, focused comparison to examine select elements of 
unmanned aerial systems, autonomous vehicles, and additive manufacturing systems. 
This methodology is designed to produce generalizable knowledge about causal questions 
related to the interaction between public policy and emerging technologies. To further 
strengthen the qualitative approach, the research focused on reducing the number of 
variables considered in each of the selected technologies, and choosing examples of 
emerging technologies that possess highly similar conditions.25 While all three 
technologies are examined using this methodology, the author’s recommendations focus 
on issues related to additive manufacturing. 
This research examines how lessons learned from other emerging technologies 
can better inform public policy related to additive manufacturing technologies. The 
methodology identifies policy similarities and differences among a select number of 
emerging technologies, selected based on availability of academic research as well as 
pertinence to the field of homeland security. This analysis is limited to unmanned aerial 
systems and autonomous vehicles, namely historical development, future drivers of 
technological maturation, and current policy considerations. As these technologies 
mature and more literature is available, future research could analyze more technologies 
and a more expansive subset of elements. This research is a snapshot in time of current 
public policy; as new policies are developed and implemented addressing not only 
additive manufacturing, but other emerging technologies, this research should be 
revisited and updated. 
                                                 
25 Alexander George and Timothy J. McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational 
Decision Making,” in Advances in Information Processing in Organizations, vol. 2, 21–58 (JAI Press, 
1985). 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Although additive manufacturing was first commercialized over 20 years ago, 
recent technological advancements associated with personal 3D printers have led many 
experts to believe the process will have significant global implications across numerous 
sectors within the next 3–5 years.26 This literature review examines a selection of sources 
pertinent to continued research about additive manufacturing and the potential future of 
the industry. While much has been written on additive manufacturing’s somewhat brief 
history and rapid technological advancements, the focus of this review is primarily 
limited to the classification of the available literature and areas open for additional 
research. 
The sources for this review have been arranged under the following topical areas: 
• common language framework for additive manufacturing 
• current capabilities and future applications of additive manufacturing 
• potential legal implications 
• implications for national and homeland security 
Sources contained in this review range from professional journals to industry 
experts’ personal blogs. The sheer number of available sources has exploded in the last 
five years due primarily to the industry’s accelerated growth and presumed future 
potential in the global marketplace. A plethora of information is currently available about 
methods, processes, and varying techniques of additive manufacturing, but there are also 
glaring shortfalls in available literature on related topics. This is especially apparent when 
one is focused on obtaining sources from academia (a topic that will be addressed later in 
this paper). 
                                                 
26 Terry Wohlers and Tim Gomet, “Additive Manufacturing and 3D Printing State of the Industry,” in 
Wohlers Annual Report 2011 (Fort Collins, CO: Wohlers, 2011). 
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A. A LANGUAGE FRAMEWORK FOR ADDITIVE MANUFACTURING 
Before engaging in an informed discussion, stakeholders must have a common 
frame for the language used by industry experts and, if applicable, mass media. This lack 
of a common framework for discussing additive manufacturing and associated 
technologies is a consistent theme across many sources. For example, the term “3D 
printer” currently carries several very different definitions, depending on the source of 
the material. Some authors use it is an umbrella term for any device used to produce 3D 
objects, while other sources use the term to distinguish a low-cost, low-capability device 
from the much higher-end, higher-capability devices. This simple point of confusion has 
made translating information to non-technical stakeholders challenging. Despite an 
established industry standard definition for additive manufacturing, “to this day, there 
isn’t a universal agreement on the definition of 3D printers.”27 The Wikipedia page, often 
the first result in a Google search for the term, defines 3D printing as, “3D printing or 
additive manufacturing [emphasis added],” insinuating the terms may be used 
interchangeably.28 Other terms, such as “rapid prototyping” and “rapid tooling,” appear 
in literature and, because of the context in which they are used, often further complicate 
the terminology agreement.29  
As noted previously, an official industry standard definition does, in fact, exist for 
additive manufacturing. Industry leaders and technical experts worked together to 
develop a short glossary of the most common terminology; interestingly enough, 
however, only a few have incorporated these standard definitions into published 
documents. Joe Hiemenz of Stratasys, an industry leader in additive manufacturing, 
acknowledges the distinction between the different types of technology is unclear.30 He 
does, however, identify one framework that has become more popular than most among 
                                                 
27 Joe Himenez, 3D Printers vs. 3D Production Systems (Eden Prairie, MN: Stratasys, 2010). 
28 “3D printing,” Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/3D_printing. 
29 Paul F. Jacobs, Stereolithography and other RP&M Technologies: From Rapid Prototyping to 
Rapid Tooling (New York: Society of Manufacturing Engineers, 1995). 
30 Hiemenz, 3D Printers vs. 3D Production System, 3. 
 11 
industry leaders and technical experts. This framework, used throughout this paper, 
identifies and defines three core terms: 
• Additive Manufacturing—an umbrella term for the process of joining 
materials to make objects from 3D model data, usually layer upon layer, as 
opposed to subtractive manufacturing methodologies (ASTM F2792)31 
• 3D Printer—a compact, low-cost, and easy-to-use device for entry-level 
additive manufacturing methods32 
• 3D System—larger, more complex, and more expensive systems designed 
for high-end functionality33 
Again, it should be noted that, outside of the industry standard, sources’ 
terminology and definitions vary greatly. In a more informal effort to address this 
disparity, 3D Printing Headquarters has created an online glossary specific to the additive 
manufacturing industry. The glossary includes hundreds of terms and the company 
updates its page by actively requesting additional information from readers about terms 
that may be missing from its database.34 While this wiki-style approach is much quicker 
and more collaborative than a more formal process, it still does not resolve the need for 
standard industry definitions. Establishing a common glossary of terms for industry 
experts as well as researchers remains an unresolved issue. 
New blogs and websites seem to be popping up daily, and many are created by 
individuals claiming to be experts in the field of 3D printing. Without an agreed-upon set 
of common terms and definitions, however, it is difficult to differentiate between sources 
of information that are reliable and those that are not. 
                                                 
31 “What Is Additive Manufacturing?” Wohler, accessed August 11, 2015, 
http://wohlersassociates.com/additive-manufacturing.html. 
32 Richard Hague and Phil Reeves, “Additive Manufacturing and 3D Printing,” Ingenica, no. 55, June 
2013. 
33 Hiemenz, 3D Printers vs. 3D Production System, 3. 
34 Jason King, “3D Printing Glossary,” 3D Printing, April 12, 2014 http://3dprinthq.com/3d-printing-
glossary/. 
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B. CURRENT CAPABILITIES AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS 
Of the topics examined in this literature review, the current capabilities and future 
applications of additive manufacturing are some of the most heavily debated. There are 
several reasons for this debate, but the two main sources of contention recognized in this 
review are the aforementioned issues regarding common language, the technology’s 
current limitations, and the speed at which the technology is changing.  
In his article, “Why 3D Printing is Overhyped,” Nick Allen, the founder of a 3D 
printing company in London, argued there are several keys factors to consider before 
believing in the so-called “3D printing revolution.”35 The three elements central to his 
argument (and the argument of several sources) are36: 
• Strength—because of the techniques used in additive manufacturing 
(layer-by-layer), 3D printed parts are inherently weaker than parts 
manufactured using traditional methods (subtractive manufacturing). 
• Speed—current technology requires hours, or even days, to produce items 
that can be made in minutes using traditional methods. 
• Cost—for this process, cost is primarily based on type and amount of 
materials used (not complexity). This means that it would be much more 
expensive to produce larger, less complex products via this process. 
In direct response to these statements, other self-proclaimed field experts argue 
that Allen’s assertions about the technology’s current capabilities are completely wrong, 
and that these systems are far more advanced than he acknowledges (in exploring these 
arguments, this thesis does not distinguish between 3D printers for personal use and those 
for commercial use or 3D systems as defined earlier in this paper). This creates confusion 
among Allen’s intended audience and those who responded to his article.37 Allen’s 
arguments, which seem to be valid, are overshadowed by the lack of clarity in his writing. 
This level of ambiguity is also evident in other sources, such as corporate web pages and, 
more importantly, reports from journalists who are not subject-matter experts in the field. 
                                                 
35 Nick Allen, “Why 3D Printing Is Overhyped (I Should Know, I Do it for a Living),” 





In addition to the confusion surrounding terminology, descriptions about current 
capabilities, limitations, and future implications of additive manufacturing vary widely. 
In the review of selected sources, no clear pattern of predictions emerged from any single 
group. Opinions varied greatly between known industry experts and academia. On one 
end of the spectrum, there are those who predict the technology will change 
manufacturing techniques, processes, and associated economies on a global level.38 At 
the other end are those who foresee a much more restricted use of the technology with 
complex 3D systems remaining in the hands of large companies and cheaper 3D printers 
being restricted to hobbyists.39  
In a report on the current capabilities and future implications of 3D technology, 
researchers at Computer Science Corporation (CSC), Vivek Srinivasan and Jarrod 
Bassan, listed the top trends to watch for in 3D printing. In part, their final list predicted 
that: 
• 3D printing will become industrial strength—no longer reserved for 
prototypes, but full-scale production of components. 
• 3D printing will start saving lives—medical implants could eventually 
reduce or eliminate the organ donor shortage. 
• 3D print shops will open at the mall—3D printing will become localized 
and fast enough for the consumer marketplace. 
• Heated debates will arise over property rights—as consumers purchase 
and then modify products, manufacturers will have to grapple with the 
prospect of their copyrighted designs being copied. 
• Digital literacy will increase—your children will bring home 3D printed 
projects and more schools will adopt the technology as prices continue to 
fall.40 
                                                 
38 Christopher D. Winnan, 3D Printing: The Next Technological Gold Rush (Christopher D. Winnan, 
2012), 228. 
39 Thomas Campbell, Christopher Williams, Olga Ivanova, and Banning Garrett, Could 3D Printing 
Change the World?: Technologies, Potentials, and Implications of Additive Manufacturing (Strategic 
Foresight Report) (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2011). 
40 Vivek Srinivasa and Jarrod Bassan, “Manufacturing the Future: 10 Trends To Come In 3D 
Printing,” Forbes, last modified December 7, 2012 http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2012/12/07/ 
manufacturing-the-future-10-trends-to-come-in-3d-printing/.   
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The tone of this report, and others like it, suggests that 3D printing has already 
made the leap from an emerging technology to a transformative one. Rather than focusing 
on the advanced use of these technologies, such as military and aerospace projects, these 
reports often cite uses of the technology for more common applications, such as tools, 
shoes, and children’s toys, attempting to convince the reader of the ease with which 
popular products are made.41 Other authors, who also see a massive global expansion for 
the industry, focus their attention on the more advanced uses of the technology, such as 
the national defense and health and medical fields. These predictions are based on the 
speed at which the technology has evolved over the past five years, and include “self-
healing” vehicles and aircraft made completely from a 3D printer.42 
These examples represent a set of opinions from sources that predict a bright 
future for 3D printing and often disregard the technology’s current limitations. There are 
more conservative opinions that highlight the inherent weaknesses of 3D printing as it 
currently exists. Factors such as cost, complexity, and price overshadow the future 
possibilities and global diffusion. Arguments suggest these three elements alone could 
limit the technology’s applicability to large corporations dealing with very complex 
modeling or the random hobbyist with a specific interest in 3D printing.43  
When examining sources of information on 3D printing, it is easy to classify most 
sources into three distinct categories. In the first category are those individuals and 
organizations that predict a 3D printing global diffusion—a world in which every 
household will be using 3D printers to fabricate items they need on a daily basis.44 The 
second category focuses on the current limitations of the technology and predicts a much 
more limited future for the industry. In the third category are the groups that recognize 
the future potential of the technology but do not discount its current technological 
                                                 
41 Vivek Srinivasa and Jarrod Bassan, 2012. 
42 William Koff and Paul Gustafson, 3D Printing and the Future of Manufacturing (Falls Church, VA: 
CSC, 2012). 
43 Allen, “Why 3D Printing Is Overhyped.”  
44 Hague and Reeves, “Additive Manufacturing and 3D Printing.” 
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limitations. This middle-ground category is where most sources outside of popular media 
reports tend to be positioned. 
1. Potential Legal Implications 
Compared to other aspects of this review, the amount of available information on 
additive manufacturing’s legal implications is somewhat limited. This is primarily 
because the technology, while nearly 30 years old, has only recently been affordable for 
the average consumer. Now that average consumers can afford some of the more basic 
technology, lawmakers must begin to understand its international legal implications. 
Sources cover a variety of these legal implications, but two central themes emerge: 
• Intellectual property rights—3D printing and supporting tools allow 
almost anyone to intentionally or unintentionally recreate an existing 
product design, distribute that design, and manufacture the product, 
causing the manufacturer to lose out on significant investment in design, 
manufacturing, and marketing.45 
• Undetectable Firearms Act—The original law passed in the United 
States in 1988 makes it illegal for anyone to manufacture, import, sell, 
ship, deliver, possess, transfer, or receive any firearm that is not detectable 
by an airport metal detector. The law was extended again in 2013 but 
many are saying that the law alone is no longer enough, given the impact 
of 3D printing technologies.46 
Despite the identified need for action, sources indicate that progress has been 
stalled in many cases by partisan politics. In 2013, the federal government again extended 
the Undetectable Firearms Act, but any additional discussion on the implications of 3D 
technology was ineffective; parties were split on appropriate approaches to address these 
concerns.47 While most sources avoid specific legal recommendations, they agree that 
these concerns must be considered now. As for any new area of technology, there may 
well be challenges while the legal frameworks catch up with the rate of technological 
                                                 
45 Koff and Gustafson, 3D Printing and the Future of Manufacturing. 
46 Richard Brown, “The Undetectable Firearms Act and 3D Printed Guns (FAQ),” CNET.com, last 
modified December 10, 2012, http://www.cnet.com/news/the-undetectable-firearms-act-and-3d-printed-
guns-faq/. 
47 Brown, “The Undetectable Firearms Act.” 
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change. Debating and developing legislation and regulation at an early stage will be 
important to make the most of the technology’s benefits.48 
2. National and Homeland Security Implications 
Sources addressing additive manufacturing, especially 3D printing, in the field of 
national and homeland security are also somewhat scarce. Most material simply 
highlights the advancements the military has either achieved or continues to research, 
such as the 3D printing of parts for military vehicles, bombs, food, and even skin.49 
Innovations such as these would have a significant effect on national security, but few 
sources go beyond discussing the actual products. One exception is the Strategic 
Foresight Report on 3D printing. It highlights four areas in which this technology could 
impact our national (and homeland) security: 
• Weapons manufacturing could become easier—guns, bullets, bombs, and 
similar products could become cheaper and more easily accessible 
• Weapons could be much more easily disguised (e.g., improvised explosive 
devices that look identical to non-weapons) 
• Terrorists could lose their dependency on developed countries for their 
supplies 
• Implications will also exist for counterfeiting50 
Somewhat vague in its presentation, the report highlights some of the potential 
impacts that 3D printing could have on the national security of the United States, but falls 
short of proposing possible solutions to these areas of concern. 
Sources focused on homeland security issues are primarily concerned with the 
possibility of individuals printing their own personal firearms undetectable by normal 
security measures. Most of the information contained within these sources can be traced 
back to claims made by Defense Distributed, a company whose stated aim is to disrupt 
                                                 
48 Hague and Reeves, “Additive Manufacturing and 3D Printing.” 
49 Zachary Davies Boren, “US Army to use 3D printing for food, bombs, everything,” Independent, 
last updated September 8, 2014, http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/us-army-to-use-
3d-printing-for-food-bombs-everything-9643721.html. 
50 Campbell, Williams, Ivanova, and Garrett, Could 3D Printing Change the World?. 
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the concept and mechanism of firearms regulation via 3D printed technology.51 While 
many sources use this company’s claims as a rallying cry for regulation, it is apparent 
that very few of these sources understand what Defense Distributed has actually been 
able to accomplish at this point—or they present information in a way that intentionally 
evokes a response from a given audience. Furthermore, of the few sources mentioning the 
current laws and regulations already in place to prevent this very scenario, most sources 
only reference laws as a backdrop for how they can be exploited.52 There is a clear gap in 
available, unbiased sources examining the implications of this technology for homeland 
security. 
C. SUMMARY 
As previously noted, the first hurdle when examining sources of information on 
additive manufacturing and 3D printing is understanding the varied terminology. Because 
authors often mistakenly use related terms interchangeably, it takes extra effort to 
decipher the author’s writing and fully appreciate central arguments and claims. The level 
of ambiguity also makes several sources simply unusable in the absence of further 
clarification. 
The spectrum for describing additive manufacturing’s current capabilities and 
future implications remains broad. With that said, sources generally agree about the 
potential for continued advancement for both complex and capable 3D systems and 
lower-end 3D printers. Even with the costs continuing to drop, however, there remain too 
many barriers—such as complexity and fabrication time—to think people will start 
replacing cheap items around the home with 3D printed products. As William Koff and 
Paul Gustafson note, “Although it is hard to predict where 3D printing at home will lead, 
it is safe to bet that consumers won’t use these printers to recreate what they can already 
                                                 
51 Defense Distributed, last updated August 2014, https://defdist.org/ 
52 Joshua Kopstein, “Guns Want to be Free: What Happens When 3D Printing and Crypto-anarchy 
Collide,” The Verge, last modified April 12, 2013, http://www.theverge.com/2013/4/12/4209364/guns-
want-to-be-free-what-happens-when-3d-printing-and-crypto-anarchy. 
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buy in stores.”53 The reduction in costs could lead to more hobbyists and individuals 
experimenting with the devices, but the true impact is still unknown. 
The primary focus of available information on additive manufacturing’s potential 
impact on the legal system, especially in the United States, is copyright issues and illegal 
firearms (undetectable and untraceable). While, at present, many of these considerations 
have stalled at the federal legislative level, there is a noticeable gap in source material 
from academic institutions examining these proposals. Many of the available sources 
included in this review have a vested interest in copyright protection issues and, as such, 
contain inherent biases dictated by their particular positions on a given issue. As noted, 
what is clear is that the legal system is lagging behind the advancements currently being 
made in this industry. 
Trustworthy, unbiased sources addressing potential national and homeland 
security issues are also limited. It is possible that many of these issues have not been 
addressed simply because the future of the technologies and industry is unpredictable. 
Several sources suggest the additive manufacturing technology currently available to the 
private individual (the low-end 3D printer) is simply not advanced enough to cause any 
real concern for homeland security practitioners. Issues that have surfaced on the federal 
radar, such as gun control, consistently end up falling prey to partisan politics with very 
little movement toward meaningful action. As additive manufacturing technology 
continues to spread to a wider audience, homeland security practitioners will no doubt be 
forced to consider its potential implications, despite the absence of federal or state 
legislation. 
                                                 
53 Koff and Gustafson, 3D Printing and the Future of Manufacturing. 
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III. EMERGING TECHNOLOGY 
At first glance, the worlds of emerging technology and public policy seem 
incompatible. After all, emerging technology is considered cutting edge, extremely 
dynamic, and visionary, while the common perception of government is that of a slow, 
bureaucratic, and reactionary machine. Gerald R. Faulhaber, a professor at the Wharton 
School of the University of Pennsylvania, notes, “If anything, governments are perceived 
by many to be a problem, not a solution, to the enhancement of a nation’s technological 
capabilities, with its power to tax, regulate, and otherwise burden innovation at every 
turn.”54 This is a consistent theme in many arguments focused on the government’s role 
in deciding the future of additive manufacturing technology and practices. Many view 
any government involvement (usually expressed in the form of regulation) as a barrier to 
future innovation; but how accurate is this perception?55 There are certainly examples to 
support this view—the seemingly unprepared government attempting to hastily shut 
down or seriously limit unexpected technologies via overregulation. The rise of Napster 
and the rapid proliferation of peer-to-peer sites are good examples of not only reactionary 
legislation to an unforeseen technology, but also the futility of such regulation.56 For the 
first time, peer-to-peer technology enabled users with Internet connections and the 
installed computer application to instantly share files (both personal or fair use files, and 
those protected by copyright) without having to go through a centralized server (see 
Figure 1).57 
                                                 
54 Gerald R. Faulhaber, Emerging Technologies and Public Policy: Lessons Learned from the Internet, 
University of Pennsylvania, February 1999. 
55 Signe Brewster, “Can 3D Printing Avoid a Napster Moment?,” Gigaom, September 18, 2013, 
https://gigaom.com/2013/09/18/can-3d-printing-avoid-a-napster-moment/.  
56 Corey Rayburn, “After Napster,” Virginia Journal of Law and Technology 6, no. 3 (Fall 2001), 
http://www.vjolt.net/vol6/issue3/v6i3-a16-Rayburn.html  
57 Jeff Tyson, “How the Old Napster Worked,” October 30, 2000, HowStuffWorks, 
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/napster.htm.  
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Figure 1.  Napster Central Index Server 
 
From Tyson, Jeff. “How the Old Napster Worked.” October 30, 2000. How Stuff Works. 
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/napster.htm. 
While opponents claimed this technology was a clear infringement on the existing 
copyright laws, users often cited the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, which 
protected the sharing of digital recordings not intended for commercial use.58 Clearly, the 
peer-to-peer technology had caught policymakers off-guard; it took years for legislation 
to address issues raised by this technology.59 While the legislation slowly came together, 
the impact of piracy on the U.S. economy was estimated at $10 billion annually.60 How 
much could have been saved if policymakers understood peer-to-peer technology prior to 
Napster’s launch? Other, more recent examples still playing out in the legislative arena 
                                                 
58 Audio Home Recording Act, Title 17, Chapter 10, of the U.S. Code, October 28, 1992. 
59 Jeff Tyson, 2000. 
60 Steven E. Siwek, “The True Cost of Sound Recording Piracy on the U.S. Economy,” Institute for 
Policy Innovation Center for Technology Freedom, October 3, 2007, http://ipi.org/ipi_issues/detail/the-
true-cost-of-copyright-industry-piracy-to-the-us-economy. 
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are Bitcoin, the crypto-currency, and Uber, the electronic, cashless taxi service.61 These 
technologies are not only unexpected, they are also threatening to disrupt powerful 
industries. In several cases, these threatened industries have leveraged their political 
influence to limit or even eliminate these technologies before they can gain much 
traction.62 At the same time, the increased adoption rate and popularity of these new 
technologies suggests legislative bodies must address these emerging technologies in a 
measured and educated manner or face the prospect of an unhappy constituency.  
Countering these examples, however, are cases in which government interest, 
direct involvement, and investment actually paved the way for innovation. It was the 
research and funding led by the Department of Defense’s Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (ARPA) in the 1960s that created the groundwork for what became the World 
Wide Web (now more commonly referred to as the Internet).63 While Apple takes much 
of the credit for their innovative iPhones and iPads, it was government funding that 
helped create many of those devices’ individual components. Mariana Mazzucato has 
been making a name for herself discussing government involvement in innovation via her 
TED talks. Mazzucato notes, “Each of [the iPhone’s] core technologies—capacitive 
sensors, solid-state memory, the click wheel, GPS, Internet, cellular communications, 
Siri, microchips, touchscreen—came from research efforts and funding support of the 
U.S. government and military.”64 As is the case with most arguments, the truth about 
government and public policy’s effect on emerging technology, if there could ever be 
such a thing, lies somewhere between the extremes.  
To better understand the arguments that exist between these extreme views, one 
must first understand the multiple ways in which a government can determine an 
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62 Jared Meyer, “Paris Uber Protests: It’s the Government vs. the Consumer and it’s not Just in 
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emerging technology’s trajectory beyond the limiting aspects of regulation. In examining 
the government’s role in creating and developing the Internet, Faulhaber identified five 
distinct models for government involvement in innovation. To Faulhaber, these models 
represent the full spectrum of government involvement in innovation, and the list ranks 
this involvement by increasing level of public intervention. 
1. Institutional Infrastructure—governments provide legal frameworks 
and public institutions that encourage or discourage innovation 
2. Research Infrastructure—governments invest in basic research (physics, 
electronics, microbiology, software, and other fundamental disciplines) 
and encourage the results to be widely disseminated by scholarly 
publication 
3. Military Technology—direct government funding for defense-related 
technologies, particularly aviation/space and electronics/communications 
4. Government Directives—a more interventionist model, in which 
governments take a direct role in encouraging or protecting the 
commercial exploitation of well-understood technologies, but do not 
directly fund it 
5. Government Subsidies—perhaps the most interventionist model, in 
which governments explicitly attempt to “pick winners,” providing 
monetary support to specific organizations65 
These five models illustrate that government involvement in innovation and 
emerging technology can go well beyond mere regulation. Each emerging technology 
discussed in this thesis has had varying levels of government involvement during initial 
development and evolution, as well as continued policy considerations. Until they made 
their way into the private sector over the last decade, unmanned aerial systems (UAS) 
were developed almost exclusively by the military. Conversely, autonomous vehicle 
technology has grown primarily from the private sector. Outside of a few examples, 
which will be discussed later in this paper, the U.S. military has invested comparatively 
little funding into the continued development of autonomous vehicle technology, 
especially when compared to its investments in UAS technology. These varied levels of 
government involvement have directly impacted the technologies’ paths, but not always 
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predictably. Identifying lessons learned from the successes and failures of these 
technologies to current issues with additive manufacturing can help policymakers avoid 
the surprise and related pitfalls when attempting to address the future of additive 
manufacturing in the United States. 
At its core, a UAS requires three elements: an operator, a vehicle, and a satellite 
(see Figure 2).66 The operator is responsible for the initial launch of the vehicle. Once in 
flight, however, operators can either continue to remotely pilot the vehicle manually, or 
the vehicle could simply follow a pre-programmed flight path using an onboard 
geospatial positioning system (GPS). Either method of flight requires information from 
the vehicle to be collected by onboard cameras and other sensors, and then transmitted 
via satellite back to the original launch site for continued control.67 While transmitting 
information back to its launch base, the vehicle can also interact with other elements in 
the field, such as field-deployed ground troops. As the next section of this paper 
illustrates, this real-time data has become increasingly valuable to the U.S. military in 
particular.68 
Figure 2.  Unmanned Aerial System 
 
From Drone Justice. “How a Drone Works.” Accessed July 3, 2015, 
http://dronejustice.com/what-is-a-uas/how-a-drone-works/. 
                                                 





A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND FUTURE APPLICATIONS 
As is the case with most technologies, the most complex UASs today have roots 
in a much simpler technology. While looking nothing like its successors, many experts 
tend to agree that the first use of something resembling a UAS was in the mid-1800s.69 
On August 22, 1849, 200 pilotless balloons were outfitted with bombs and launched in an 
attack against the city of Venice.70 Expanding their use in the United States Civil War, 
both the Union and Confederate armies used unmanned balloons for limited bombing 
operations.71 During the Spanish-American War, the U.S. military attached a camera to a 
kite, creating the first aerial surveillance pictures.72 For further advancements in the use 
of unmanned aerial systems beyond mere mechanical means to occur, developments in 
other technologies, such as radio technology, had to first be realized.  
Moving beyond its very distant mechanical relatives, the first use of electronic 
UASs can be traced back to World War I (WWI), when both the British and U.S. 
militaries experimented with aerial torpedoes and flying bombs in an effort to destroy 
German U-boat facilities.73 One such example developed by the U.S. Army in early 1918 
was named “Kettering Bug” after its designer, Charles Kettering. The Bug, weighing in at 
a little over 500 pounds, was designed to launch mechanically via a ramp and pulley 
system; once in flight, however, it was controlled through a series of vacuum and 
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electrical systems.74 October 22, 1918 marked the Bug’s first successful flight. Thus, 
only 15 years after the advent of manned flight, a device completely controlled via 
remote operators successfully dropped an explosive payload on an intended target.75 
Although, due to the number of failed attempts, a deployable version of the technology 
was not completed prior to the end of hostilities, these early developments would pave 
the way for much more advanced systems following the war.76  
Following WWI, the U.S. military’s interest in unmanned flight diminished 
significantly as the nation instead focused on the continued development of its national 
air management system. This investment included the development and deployment of 
navigation aids, airdromes, weather stations, and control centers intended to make long-
distance overland flight safer and more regular.77 While significantly diminished, the 
military’s interest in unmanned aerial system technology did not disappear altogether. 
The years between WWI and WWII saw continued advancements in radio and television 
technology that would quickly find their way into UASs of the time. 
Operation Aphrodite was a secret United States Air Force operation designed to 
not only deliver a devastating explosive payload against enemy targets, but also to 
dispose of B-17s that were of no further use to the military.78 B-17s designated for these 
missions were first stripped of all their normal armament and then loaded with as much 
explosive ordinance as possible. They were then outfitted with radio remote control 
systems that used television cameras for targeting purposes. Following a manually piloted 
liftoff, the pilots would bail out to safety and control would be given to a “mothership” 
trailing the aircraft at a distance of up to six miles.79 Contrary to military leaders’ 
expectations, Operation Aphrodite was far from successful. Of the eight missions flown, 
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only one landed close enough to its intended target to cause any significant damage. 
Several planes crashed prematurely, and one even landed safely in enemy territory, 
gifting the Germans a perfectly intact B-17.80 
Following the end of WWII, a significant shift occurred in the continued use and 
development of UASs. The Cold War and the Vietnam War necessitated the development 
of UASs that could gather intelligence in areas far removed from combat. This meant 
new UASs had to be designed to remain in flight for extended durations and equipped 
with technology that would enhance their intelligence-gathering capabilities.81 
Advancements in UAS photographic technology often met or exceeded the militaristic 
requirements and expectations at the time.82 So successful was the implementation of 
new technology into UASs that, during the Vietnam War, from 1964–1975, over 1,000 
UASs flew over 34,000 reconnaissance and surveillance missions across Southeast 
Asia.83 The central drawback of the increased UAS use during this period was the length 
of time these devices could remain in the air, maxing out at around 120–180 minutes.84 
Despite these limitations, these devices saved lives; pilots were no longer required to 
personally fly in dangerous airspace for most reconnaissance missions.  
Military interest in UASs once again waned following the conclusion of the 
Vietnam War. The combination of drastic cuts in military spending and increased interest 
in high-speed missile systems, long-range bombers, and cruise missiles meant that 
advancements in UASs were virtually non-existent for nearly a decade.85 The Persian 
Gulf War in 1990 and 1991 once again drew a renewed interest in UASs from the 
military. But with the conflict lasting less than a year, UASs did not see much action. 
Frustrated with the lack of progress, Congress banned the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA) from further UAS research and essentially forced the 
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Pentagon to house the program in an office not funded for research.86 When yet another 
international conflict broke out in the former Yugoslavia requiring immediate 
intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) circumvented the Congressional 
block and acquired a number of UASs for intelligence-gathering purposes.87 
Improvements to UAS design in the early 1990s eventually led to the birth of the most 
recognizable UAS design today, the Predator. Like most of its predecessors, the Predator 
was primarily engaged in intelligence-related operations. Following the events of 
September 11, 2001, however, the CIA and subsequently the U.S. military quickly went 
to work arming the Predator for targeted killing operations supporting the Global War on 
Terror (GWOT).88 Because of the Predator’s high-profile involvement in the GWOT and 
resulting frequency of its appearances in popular media over the last decade, any mention 
of drone technology is usually associated with the weaponized version of this model 
UAS.89 This association with the weaponized Predator has been identified as one reason 
Americans tend to support the continued use of drones overseas in military operations 
(drone strikes), but do not want them used domestically by law enforcement agencies or 
private sector companies such as Amazon.90 
Often neglected in popular media, but gaining popularity and momentum in the 
global marketplace over the past five years, however, is the commercial and consumer 
side of UAS technology.91 With a much shorter and certainly less storied history than 
their military counterparts, commercial and consumer UASs only started appearing in the 
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last decade.92 Radio-controlled (RC) airplanes and helicopters had, in fact, been around 
for decades, but always relied on a human operator to control the apparatus in flight. 
Recent advancements in GPS technology enabled the new devices to not only be pre-
programmed for flight without a human operator, but also made it affordable to the 
average hobbyist or regular consumer. A basic quadcopter with a mid-level camera can 
be purchased on Amazon for under $100. Experts predict the combination of these two 
factors, the improvements in related UAS technology, and the low cost of entry into the 
market suggest demand for commercial and consumer UASs will only increase over the 
next decade.93 
B. DRIVERS FOR TECHNOLOGICAL MATURATION 
As previously discussed, a significant driver in the ongoing development and 
increased capabilities of UASs has been related to military operations. Improvements in 
UASs were needed for faster and more reliable intelligence, more accurate target 
acquisition capabilities, and to simply enable the military to go places not humanly 
possible—such as the middle of a nuclear cloud to collect radiation samples following a 
nuclear detonation.94  WWII provided yet another incentive for UAS enhancements. With 
a staggering 40,000 aircraft destroyed and over 80,000 crewmembers killed in that war 
alone, the move toward UASs was both humane and economical.95 Those same 
motivations remain to this day as danger persists with conflicts in the Middle East and the 
U.S. military’s role in the ongoing GWOT.   
Another driver for UAS maturation on the military side of the technology has the 
potential to impact the United States’ position in the global marketplace. As one of the 
few countries with highly sophisticated and weaponized UASs, the United States has 
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benefitted from relatively little competition in the manufacturing and distribution of these 
systems.96 How long that lasts, however, remains to be seen. With countries such as 
China, Israel, Italy, and the United Kingdom developing their own UASs, some with 
weaponized capabilities, the competition to have the most sophisticated fleet is likely to 
pressure the United States for continuous enhancements.97 
The private sector is also exerting significant influence on the continued 
enhancement of UAS technology.98 Global giants such as Amazon have not only 
expressed interest in using UASs for daily operations, but have already begun to invest 
their own resources into research and design (R&D) efforts. In a letter to the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) Administrator, Vice President for Global Public Policy at 
Amazon, Paul Misener, outlined Amazon’s future goal of implementing the program 
Amazon Prime Air. According to Misener, the objective of this program is to use UAS 
technology to deliver packages to a customer’s door within 30 minutes of placing an 
order.99 Misener’s letter also highlights that Amazon’s own R&D efforts have enabled 
them to design UASs to meet their company’s specific needs; for example, an aerial 
vehicle that can travel over 50 miles per hour and safely carry a payload of up to five 
pounds.100 Commercial efforts and investments such as these will continue to drive future 
UAS innovations.  
Finally, an often-overlooked source of innovation, especially as it pertains to 
advanced technology, is the private individual. Commonly self-identified as “tinkerers,” 
these are the people who obtain a technology and figure out ways to make it better, or 
better suited to their specific needs.101 From the earliest days of radio-controlled 
airplanes to the development of the Predator, tinkerers have played an important role in 
                                                 
96 Kristin Roberts, “When the Whole World Has Drones,” National Journal Magazine, March 21, 
2013, http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/when-the-whole-world-has-drones-20130321.  
97 Ibid. 
98 Alex Ashworth, “Rise of the Commercial Drone,” BlueFetch, June, 1, 2015, 
http://bluefletch.com/blog/rise-of-the-commercial-drone/.  
99 Amazon Letter, July 9, 2014.  
100 Ibid. 
101 Mark Hatch, The Maker Movement Manifesto (New York: McGraw Hill, 2014).  
 30 
UAS innovation.102 That role is no less important today, especially now that cheaper 
technology is available to a broader audience. The DJI Phantom Aerial Drone 
Quadcopter, currently retailing for around $500, started out as one person’s simple idea 
to attach a GoPro camera to a small UAS.103 In fact, DJI, which is about to become a 
billion-dollar company focused on UASs, was launched in 2006 by Frank Wang while he 
was a student at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.104 At the time, 
most consumer drones were focused on the serious hobbyist and required a certain level 
of experience to construct and fly. Recognizing the opportunity, Wang directed his 
company into developing simple, easy-to-use, but comparably capable UASs, and his 
success is now global.105 As more tinkerers like Wang obtain these technologies, there is 
no way to accurately predict the origin of the next big idea or the industry’s trajectory in 
general. As the next section illustrates, this industry’s unpredictability also hampers the 
development of informed public policy. 
C. PUBLIC POLICY 
To describe the current environment succinctly, public policy on domestic UAS 
use in the United States is currently under intense debate. This debate includes civilian, 
commercial, law-enforcement, and other public use. The FAA is charged with the safety 
and security of the nation’s airspace and, as such, has been tasked by Congress (via the 
FAA Modernization Act of 2012) to develop appropriate policies for the safe integration 
of UASs into the National Airspace by September 30, 2015.106 The Department of 
Transportation’s (DOT) Assistant Inspector General, Matthew Hampton, testified before 
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Congress that DOT will not complete the assigned provisions by that deadline.107 
According to Hampton, of the 17 assigned provisions involving the integration of UASs 
into the National Airspace, only nine will be completed by the September deadline.108  
The FAA’s inability to establish a regulatory framework for UAS integration in 
the national airspace has not prevented their use. It has, however, created an environment 
in which public sector entities such as law enforcement agencies and emergency 
management agencies, private sector companies, and individual civilians are all operating 
UASs with little to no formal federal guidelines. In absence of federal guidelines, several 
organizations established their own. As far back as 2012, the International Association of 
Chiefs of Police (IACP) was considering the potential implications of this technology and 
issued their own guidelines on the use of drones for law enforcement related 
operations.109 While IACP was applauded for their efforts and forward thinking, their 
guidelines focused almost exclusively on privacy issues and did little to address the safe 
integration of UASs into the national airspace.110 While the IACP and other 
organizations developed basic guidelines and recommendations, none of those proposals 
had the actual weight of law. This created confusion for both the operators and the 
general public, which still exists today.111 As a result, the public’s confidence in the 
government’s ability to adequately address UAS issues has been shaken and, more 
importantly, has created potentially dangerous situations in the field.    
In September 2013, Chris Miser, the owner of Falcon UAV, was working with 
Colorado Emergency Management Agency personnel during a flooding event outside of 
Boulder, Colorado. Miser was sharing data one of his drones captured from a town that 
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had been directly impacted by floodwaters when, after receiving approval from his local 
contacts, he prepared to send another drone out to capture similar data in a neighboring 
town. According to Miser, prior to launching his second drone, he was called once again 
by one of his local contacts at the emergency operations center (EOC) and was told that 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) “was in control of the airspace and 
that if his drone took off, he would be arrested.”112 The fact that FEMA does not have 
arresting authorities notwithstanding, confusion over the use of UASs in controlled 
airspace could have been disastrous in this particular case. Civil Air Patrol and the 
National Guard routinely send their own air assets into the airspace surrounding disaster 
locations for damage assessments and search and rescue operations, and those flights 
have to be closely coordinated with the Federal Coordination Official (FCO) and the 
FAA to avoid possible accidents.113 A private sector company attempting to assist 
response operations may have good intentions, but without proper policies and protocols 
in place it has the potential to cause more harm than good. These types of scenarios will 
only continue until FAA is able to establish policies to which commercial UAS operators 
can adhere. 
UAS policy issues surrounding emergency management and law enforcement 
agencies tend to receive a lot of attention in the media, as they should. The implications 
of public-entity UAS use have the potential to impact the very interpretations of our 
Constitution and the notions set forth by the Fourth Amendment.114 While these debates 
rage on, however, another issue has both literally and figuratively flown under the radar. 
This often-overlooked policy deficiency pertains to the use of what the FAA classifies as 
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model aircraft.115 While on the surface this issue may not appear to be as critical as 
others, recent events have showcased the danger UASs pose to commercial airliners.  
On March 29, 2015, Shuttle America Flight 2708 was making its final approach 
toward a runway at LaGuardia Airport when the flight’s pilot was forced to quick ascend 
200 feet to avoid hitting a drone. The flight crew reported the unmanned aircraft was 
flying at an altitude of about 2,700 feet at the time.116 This is but one of hundreds of FAA 
incident reports in the last year alone describing scenarios in which commercial airliners 
nearly collided with UASs.117 These concerns are not unique to the United States. On 
April 20, 2015, a UAS spotted at Manchester Airport in the United Kingdom grounded 
flights for 20 minutes and forced several other flights to be diverted elsewhere.118 
Explaining the danger of these drones to aircraft, Jim Williams, head of FAA’s UAS 
office, noted, “Imagine a metal and plastic object—especially one with a big lithium 
battery—going into a high-speed engine. The results could be catastrophic.”119 
Williams goes on to note that the complexity of integrating such technology into 
the national airspace is no simple task. While this is certainly true, the fact remains that 
the FAA essentially did nothing to update its policy for radio-controlled aircraft for over 
25 years. Advisory Circular 91–57, issued in June 1981, provides little more than 
voluntary safety guidelines for model aircraft operators. The only specific requirements 
outlined in the document are for operators to keep their models below 400 feet and to 
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notify the nearby traffic control tower if flying within three miles of an airport.120 As the 
UAS technology around them drastically changed over the period of a quarter of a 
century, no one at FAA saw the need to update this policy. 
Finally, recognizing the need to update this policy, the FAA has issued 
preliminary guidance and new UAS classifications while the FAA Modernization and 
Reform Act of 2012 is under revision. Unfortunately, the new classifications are 
ambiguous at best and the draft policies are potentially dangerous. Under the proposed 
policy, commercial and public sector entities must apply for a certificate to operate prior 
to their actual flights, as long as the device is used for recreational or hobby purposes and 
is under 55 pounds in total weight; civilians, however, do not have to apply for the same 
certificate.121 Furthermore, given the specific language on the site itself, the degree to 
which these guidelines will be enforced is questionable. According to the FAA website, 
“Individuals flying for hobby or recreation are strongly encouraged to follow safety 
guidelines.”122 The current language in the proposed rules suggests operators in the 
commercial and public sectors, who would be expected to take some level of training 
prior to flying an apparatus owned by a company or organization, are subjected to more 
scrutiny from the FAA than untrained private operators.  
As the sole agency tasked by Congress to identify and develop the quickest and 
safest, and legal ways forward, , the actions of the military, law enforcement community, 
private sector, and the private citizens are all applying considerable pressure on the FAA. 
Concurrently, individual states have begun to implement their own UAS policies. Since 
2012, 45 states have considered over 150 separate bills related to the use of UASs.123 Not 
surprisingly, these bills vary greatly in scope, complexity, and focus. Many bills focus on 
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specific law enforcement activities while others address a wider selection of issues.124 
Michigan SB 54 prohibits the use of a UAS to interfere or harass an individual who is 
hunting, while “Mississippi SB 2022 specifies that using a drone to commit ‘peeping 
tom’ activities is a felony.”125 The entire collection of state legislation to date can be best 
described as a patchwork of related but very different pieces of regulation. This is to be 
expected when 50 separate entities try to individually address issues related to UASs—
even more so when no federal legislation exists. This approach to UAS legislation is 
inefficient and confusing for private citizens and commercial companies desiring to 
operate a UAS legally, which is an approach that should be avoided when attempting to 
address concerns related to additive manufacturing. 
D. SUMMARY 
As this paper has illustrated, for almost a century, nearly every investment into 
the continued enhancement of UASs originated from a government; primarily for the 
purposes of supporting military operations. Despite this level of direct government 
involvement however, policymakers were seemingly unprepared for the technology’s 
leap into private sector markets. Now that the technology has become significantly less 
expensive and more widespread, policymakers must quickly develop a coherent strategy 
for the safe incorporation of UASs into the national airspace. Because this strategy does 
not currently exist, organizations with a vested interest in the use of UASs have 
attempted to independently address identified issues via their own policy development 
process (see Table 1 for summary). As the military, private sector, and private citizens 
continue to push the continued advancement of this technology, it is critical that UAS 
policy is strategically developed in a collaborative environment with impacted 
stakeholders.  
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Table 1.   Unmanned Aerial Systems Policy 
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IV. AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES 
Sridhar Lakshamanan, a professor of engineering at the University of Michigan-
Dearborn and an autonomous vehicle expert, notes there are three basic elements needed 
to convert a regular car into an automated vehicle: a GPS, a system of sensors to 
recognize the dynamic environment, and a computer to process the information and 
convert it into vehicle actions.126 Simplified, the autonomous vehicle uses technology to 
simulate actions normally handled by the human brain. A myriad of sensors continuously 
interacts with the environment and send the data to a computer, which tells the vehicle to 
perform actions such as braking or changing lanes (see Figure 3). While it will be years 
before an autonomous vehicle is available for public use, the technology is improving 
enough to predict a safer roadway after widespread adoption.127 
Figure 3.  Autonomous Vehicle Sensors 
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The desire to build a truly autonomous vehicle has been around since the 
invention of the automobile itself. But, as is the case throughout much of human history, 
technology had to catch up to turn mere dreams into a reality. Over the last century, 
inventors have quickly worked to integrate new technologies into the automobile. Early 
experiments in radio-controlled vehicles in the 1920s produced one of the first 
“driverless” cars, the Linrrican Wonder, but the requirement to have it operated via 
human control made it far from truly autonomous.128 Other prototypes in the 1920s and 
1930s simply demonstrated improvements in the use of radio technology to remotely 
pilot a driverless vehicle.  
Constrained by the limits of radio technology and pre-dating the digital and 
computer ages, early inventors next looked for true autonomy outside of the vehicle 
itself. At the 1939 World’s Fair in New York, American designer and futurist Norman 
Bel Geddes introduced his vision in the Futurama ride: an autonomous system that relied 
not only on the technology inside the vehicle, but the interaction of that technology with 
sensors imbedded in the road.129 Because much of the danger for drivers at the time was 
the road itself, often very narrow and poorly marked, Geddes’ concept suggested 
improvements to both the vehicle and the highway system in which it was intended to be 
used.130 Possibly stimulated by the underlying concepts of the Futurama exhibit, the idea 
of an intelligent highway system quickly became the popular route to achieving a truly 
autonomous vehicle. In fact, those concepts became so popular that companies and 
inventors spent the next 40 years trying to perfect the interaction between the intelligent 
vehicle and the smart highway. 
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In 1956, General Motors (GM) introduced the Firebird II, a concept car guided by 
electronic sensors in the highway.131 In the late 1960s and into the 1970s, the Bendix 
Corporation also developed several driverless vehicle prototypes that interacted with 
cables buried next to the highway.132 At the same time, thousands of miles away, the 
Transport and Road Research Laboratory in the United Kingdom was testing similar 
ideas. A prototype Citroen DS19 successfully completed high-speed trial runs guided by 
a four-mile stretch of buried cable.133 These trends continued throughout the 1960s and 
1970s with increasing sophistication in highway automation technology. However, the 
significant cost of implementing these technologies on a national highway system 
ensured they would never become a reality. 
It was not until the 1980s that the focus of the autonomous vehicle once again 
turned primarily to the vehicle itself—specifically to developing “both semi-autonomous 
and autonomous vehicles that depended little, if at all, on highway infrastructure.”134 
Advancements in visual and computer processing technology enabled researchers to 
integrate what was at the time considered to be rather sophisticated cameras and 
microprocessors into the driving functions of prototype automobiles. In one of the most 
famous examples of the advancements made in this arena at the time, a team led by 
German aerospace engineer Ernst Dickmanns outfitted a vehicle dubbed VAMORS with 
cameras, microprocessors, and other sensory equipment and successfully drove a course 
of roughly 12 miles at speeds of up to 56 miles per hour, without a human operator.135 
Eight years later, Dickmanns’ team piloted a Mercedes S-Class from Munich, Germany 
to Odense, Denmark. This trip, which totaled nearly 1,000 miles, was accomplished at 
varying speeds up to 112 miles per hour with, as Dickmanns noted, about 95% of the 
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distance traveled fully automatically.”136 At roughly the same time, in the mid-1990s, 
Carnegie Mellon University robotics drove NavLab 5, a modified Pontiac Trans Sport, 
from Pittsburgh to Los Angeles. This trip’s “autonomous driving percentage” was rated 
at 98.2%, with human interaction occurring primarily through obstacle-avoidance 
scenarios.137 The successful trials performed by these early, visually based guidance 
vehicles heavily influenced the direction of future research. Nearly all research and 
associated funding involving intelligent highways either ceased entirely or was redirected 
toward enhancing these new visually guided vehicles.138  
In the early 2000s, the U.S. military also began taking an interest in autonomous 
vehicles. In 2004, with an initial goal to have roughly 30% of its entire military vehicle 
fleet operating autonomously by 2015, the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Administration (DARPA) set up a 150-mile off-road race, and invited dozens of 
autonomous-vehicle development teams to compete for multi-million-dollar prizes.139 
The first race was less than successful; no team completed more than eight miles of the 
race.140 The next race conducted in the same environment a mere 18 months later, 
however, saw five teams successfully complete the race in roughly seven hours.141 In 
2007, the final race funded by DARPA, dubbed Urban Challenge, required teams to 
successfully navigate a 60-mile urban course while obeying all traffic laws and operating 
alongside other vehicles. Six teams completed the course and three of those six managed 
to accomplish the feat in under five hours.142 Advancements in road-following and 
collision avoidance software, along with improved radar and laser sensors, made these 
monumental strides in the capabilities of autonomous vehicles possible in a relatively 
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short amount of time.143 It is clear today that the DARPA challenges did not accomplish 
the original goal of supplanting 30% of the U.S. military’s fleet with autonomous 
vehicles by 2015. But what they did achieve was just as significant for the future of the 
industry. As James Anderson from RAND Corporation points out, “The DARPA 
Challenges solidified partnerships between auto manufacturers and the education sector, 
and it mobilized a number of endeavors in the automotive sector to advance AVs 
[autonomous vehicles].”144  
While a fully autonomous vehicle is not yet commercially available, there have 
been major strides in the decade following the first DARPA challenge. In April 2014, 
Google’s self-driving car surpassed the 700,000-mile mark without a single registered 
accident.145 Reports released at the time of the milestone indicated the car could detect 
and track hundreds of objects simultaneously, including pedestrians and even traffic 
cones.146 And while a fully autonomous vehicle may not be readily available to the 
average customer for some time, many related technologies (such as self-parking, 
automatic braking, and lane control) have already made it into several high-end models of 
commercially available automobiles. With the success of the Google car and others like 
it, the once fantastical idea that autonomous vehicles could safely transport humans from 
place to place is now considered an understandable possibility. 
B. DRIVERS FOR TECHNOLOGICAL MATURATION 
The drivers underlying the continued maturation of autonomous vehicles are 
somewhat unique when compared to other emerging technologies. Because of the cost, 
complexity, and implications to existing traffic legislation, enhancements to autonomous 
vehicles are almost entirely driven by the private sector, with support from educational 
institutions. The U.S. military has also shown some level of interest in these technologies, 
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but has invested comparatively few resources in its continued development.147 Also 
somewhat unique for an emerging technology, the primary drivers for technological 
change are in many cases the same as those that inhibit its proliferation into the market. 
To achieve a comparative advantage, automakers continually invest in ways to 
incorporate new technologies, such as auto-park and variable cruise control, into their 
vehicles, but only insofar as the consumer market will tolerate. Technologies must 
therefore not only be proven, applicable, and safe, but also relatively inexpensive. Until a 
technology meets these conditions, those same implementers would be expected to resist 
its incorporation into existing vehicles standards.148     
On the consumer level, it is currently difficult at best to predict the demand for 
autonomous vehicles over the next 20 years. Two central reasons for this unpredictability 
are changing patterns in personal automobile ownership and driving, and public 
perception of autonomous vehicle technology. 
Studies indicate that Americans are driving less and reducing the number of 
vehicles in their households. After rising almost continually since World War II, the 
number of drivers in U.S. households has declined nearly 10% since 2004.149 The 
average American household now owns fewer than two cars—a level not seen since the 
early 1990s.150 This change can be attributed to the fluctuating cost of gasoline and 
vehicle maintenance, technology that enables telecommuting, and increased public 
transportation availability.151 Data also suggests these trends will only continue, as 
younger generations simply have less interest in driving compared to their parents. A 
study completed in 2013 found that driving by young people decreased 23% from 2001 to 
2009.152 In addition, less than 70% of 19-year-olds in the United States currently have a 
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driver’s license, down nearly 20% from two decades ago.153 This continued decline in 
automobile demand will have implications to the future of autonomous vehicles.154 What 
those implications are remains unclear. 
Perhaps more tangible and certainly more immediate than the gradual decline of 
driving in the United States is the public’s opinion of autonomous vehicles. In a market 
driven by the consumer, polls suggest the public’s demand for this technology is 
lukewarm at best. When asked about their general opinion regarding autonomous and 
self-driving vehicles, 22% of U.S. respondents had a “very positive” view while roughly 
45% had either a neutral or negative view.155 Interestingly enough, roughly 70% of U.S. 
respondents believed autonomous vehicles could reduce the overall number of accidents 
in the United States, but over 60% claimed to be at least “moderately concerned” about 
driving or riding in one.156 Furthermore, over 80% of respondents were at least 
“moderately concerned” with the safety consequences of equipment failure or system 
failure.157 The most glaring response to this survey, however, was the amount of extra 
money respondents were willing to pay to have a completely autonomous vehicle. The 
median response was zero, while 10% were willing to pay an extra $5,800.158 Compared 
to the roughly $70,000 in technology it takes to properly operate the Google car, 
autonomous vehicles have a long way to go to become affordable.159 The results of this 
study and others like it indicate that, despite the high-profile Google cars and claims 
related to overall safety, the public still questions autonomous vehicles’ reliability and 
return on investment.   
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Contrary to some expert predictions that fully autonomous vehicles will be 
commonplace in the next 15 years, historical evidence suggests that, even if public 
demand were high, the deployment cycle for automobile-related technologies is 
significantly longer.160 Table 2 highlights the deployment cycle for five separate 
automobile-related technologies. Interestingly, even with a federal mandate in place and a 
comparatively simple technology to include in automobile designs, the complete market 
saturation of air bags took roughly 25 years to achieve.161 
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Table 2.   Vehicle Technology Deployment Summary 
Name Deployment Cycle Typical Cost Premium Market Saturation Share 
Air Bags 25 years (1973–1998) < $500 100% due to mandates 
Automatic Transmission 50 years (1940–1990) $1500 90% U.S., 50% worldwide 
Navigation Systems 30+ years (1985–2015+) $500 (rapidly declining) Uncertain; probably 80% 
Optional GPS Services 15 years $250 annually 2–5% 
Hybrid Vehicles 25 years (1990–2015+) $5,000 Uncertain; currently ~4% 




The future of truly autonomous vehicles remains somewhat murky, but this has 
not stopped many U.S. state governments, and to some degree even the federal 
government, from taking proactive stances in the development of legislation long before 
widespread public use. Legislative barriers still exist preventing complete public 
adoption, but rarely has legislation kept up with the pace of an emerging technology like 
it has with autonomous vehicles.162 
C. CURRENT POLICY LANDSCAPE 
Industry experts predict that fully autonomous vehicles will not be available for 
purchase by the general public for another decade, if not longer. Factors—such as the 
extended lifespan of current vehicles, higher projected purchase prices for autonomous 
vehicles, and additional operating requirements, like special permits or licenses—suggest 
that even if autonomous vehicles were publicly available, it would take much longer to 
realize their widespread adoption.163 Despite these predictions, state and federal 
policymakers have already begun to implement laws and issue guidelines intended to 
shape the industry’s future. Not all experts agree on the potential implications of the 
collective body of legislation to date, but with the rate of increase in the capabilities of 
autonomous vehicles, more legislation is certainly on its way.  
In 2012, working directly with a team of representatives from Google, Nevada 
became the first state in the United States to grant licenses for autonomous vehicles.164 
The Nevada legislation does not grant unrestricted use of autonomous vehicles, but 
identifies specific conditions under which these cars can be legally operated. Later that 
same year, Governor Jerry Brown signed a similar bill approving the use of autonomous 
vehicles in California.165 While autonomous vehicle legislation at the state level started 
slowly, it gained momentum over the last four years. The National Conference of State 
Legislatures notes that 16 states introduced legislation related to autonomous vehicles in 
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2015, up from 12 states in 2014, nine states and Washington, DC in 2013, and six states 
in 2012.166  
Barriers to the development of autonomous vehicle legislation at the state level 
vary, but common themes can be identified. While few, if any, state vehicle codes 
expressly prohibit the use of autonomous vehicles, the interpretation of current legislation 
could complicate the matter. These codes were written with the assumption that a human 
driver would be operating the vehicle, so legislation is often incompatible with the 
concept of a driverless vehicle. In one somewhat unique example, the State of New York 
requires that at least one hand remain on the wheel at all times.167 Clearly, a revision of 
current legislation would have to occur for autonomous vehicles to be allowed to operate 
in a state with such a requirement. Other state codes are more general but require the 
driver to be attentive and have the capacity to safely operate the vehicle at all times. 
Research on the varying legal interpretations of these codes is currently underway and 
nearly everything, even the definition of the term “driver,” is being examined.168  
Beyond conflicts in existing regulation, another potential barrier to the 
development of state-level policy is resistance from powerful lobbying groups. Because 
states are developing their own legislation, lobbyist and lawyer attention is focused at the 
state level. Prior to the signing of the legislation in California in 2012, the Alliance for 
Automobile Manufacturers pushed to have many of the allowances for autonomous 
vehicles removed from the final bill. The advocacy group, which includes members from 
the 12 largest automobile manufacturers, feared automakers would be liable for any 
failure of Google technology strapped to their cars.169 Conversely, it was the trial 
lawyers, a powerful constituency in the state, and interactions with Google 
representatives that successfully lobbied to keep the automakers liable.170 Similar to the 
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current legislative landscape for UASs, it is this type of environment that, in the absence 
of an overarching federal policy, produces inconsistent legislation at the state level. 
At the federal level, the U.S. Department of Transportation’s (USDOT) National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is responsible for “developing, setting, 
and enforcing federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSSs) and regulations for 
motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment.”171 In May 2013, NHTSA issued a 
preliminary policy statement about the use of autonomous vehicles. The 14-page 
document can be divided into three overarching categories: 
• An explanation of the many areas of vehicle innovation and types of 
automation that offer significant potential for enormous reductions in 
highway crashes and deaths 
• A summary of the research NHTSA has planned or has begun to help 
ensure that all safety issues related to vehicle automation are explored and 
addressed 
• Recommendations to states that have authorized operation of self-driving 
vehicles, for test purposes, on how best to ensure safe operation as these 
new concepts are being tested on highways172 
Despite acknowledging their role in the development of a national policy for the 
incorporation of autonomous vehicles onto the Nation’s highways, NHTSA’s policy 
document essentially only provides general recommendations for states looking to 
develop their own autonomous vehicle policies. The NHTSA document does provide a 
classification system for states to consider when developing their own codes but, once 
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again, these are merely recommendations that carry no weight of law.173 In fact, Motor 
Authority noted that NHTSA “has considerable concerns regarding state regulation on 
safety of self-driving vehicles and does not recommend states only permit the use of such 
vehicles for testing purposes.”174 Again, because NHTSA has to date issued only 
recommendations, states can continue to address these issues as they deem appropriate. 
In summary, actual laws pertaining to the use of autonomous vehicles are almost 
non-existent at the federal level. While NHTSA has provided a useful framework for 
consideration, it has not proposed anything beyond state-level recommendations. More 
activity has occurred at the state level, but bills are inconsistent from state to state. All 
bills tend to highlight the importance of autonomous vehicles and the need for additional 
research, but only a few actually lay the legislative groundwork for vehicle testing.175 
States with more sophisticated legislation, like Nevada, often worked directly with the 
private sector while developing policies. While overregulation could limit the future 
potential of this technology, the absence of a coordinated federal policy has created a 
patchwork of ad hoc state legislation and ensured this pattern is bound to continue. 
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As noted in this chapter, the characteristics of autonomous vehicle technology 
have kept it relatively confined to a select number of stakeholders. While these 
stakeholders remain few, namely automobile manufacturers and Google, the implications 
of the proliferation of this technology could be global. Because of this potential 
policymakers in the United States have been proactively working to develop policy in 
conjunction with the private sector (see Table 3). Despite predictions that a fully 
autonomous vehicle will not be made available to the public before 2020, the policy work 
being undertaken now will assist in its incorporation onto the nation’s public roads.    
Table 3.   Autonomous Vehicle Policy Summary 
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V. ADDITIVE MANUFACTURING 
To many, the additive manufacturing technology that enabled the sudden 
proliferation of the personal 3D printer seemed to develop overnight. This, however, is 
not the case; the origins of modern additive manufacturing processes can be traced back 
well over 100 years. While a detailed historical account of additive manufacturing’s 
evolution is not central to this paper, a brief overview of the more recent advancements in 
the industry is critical to understand many of the misconceptions associated with this 
manufacturing process. 
In September, 2009 a group of 65 experts in the field of additive manufacturing 
met in Washington, DC to develop a historical roadmap for the industry.176 This roadmap 
was designed to not only examine the origins of additive manufacturing processes, but to 
identify critical areas of focus that could advance the associated sciences in the following 
decade. Much of the information pertaining to the origins of additive manufacturing in 
this chapter has been gleaned from the final report developed from that meeting. 
Information on more modern developments of additive manufacturing has been acquired 
through the annual Wohlers Report 2014, a recognized industry expert.  
Processes that formed the underlying principles of modern additive manufacturing 
can be traced back to topographical maps and photo-sculptures in the late 1800s.177 Early 
pioneers in these fields consistently looked for ways around the limitations of the typical 
subtractive methods, the then-standard manufacturing processes of the day, and began to 
find them in comparatively crude and labor-intensive forms of current additive 
manufacturing techniques.178 Advancements in the field of photography enabled limited 
refinement to previously crude methods, but true progress within the industry did not 
occur until the second half of the 20th century.179 The concept of additive manufacturing 
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as a true industrial process began to gain momentum in the 1970s as improvements in 
laser technology made it possible to apply and, more importantly, control enough heat to 
melt a myriad of substances that could then be bonded layer by layer.180 Despite the 
developments in laser technology, none of these early techniques produced a working 
machine capable of replicating the process for industrial or personal use. 
Experts commonly attribute the origin of modern 3D printing to Charles Hull. In 
1986, Hull was issued the first patent for stereolithography—an additive manufacturing 
method that is addressed later in this paper.181 Hull had been working on a design for a 
machine to successfully employ stereolithography in the manufacturing process since 
1983, and after years of testing sold the first commercial system in 1988.182 As Hull 
perfected his method, several other technologies and processes began to emerge, all of 
which would eventually have their own impact on the industry.183 While these processes 
differed significantly from Hull’s, they all contained similar, almost entirely industrial, 
applications—more specifically, industrial prototyping.184 
It was not until the late 1990s that the industry began to visibly expand in a 
number of different directions, ushering in a new era of 3D printing. According to 3D 
Printing Industry, 
During the mid-nineties, the sector started to show signs of distinct 
diversification with two specific areas of emphasis that are much more 
clearly defined today. First, there was the high end of 3D printing, still 
very expensive systems, which were geared towards part production for 
high value, highly engineered, complex parts. At the other end of the 
spectrum, some of the 3D printing system manufacturers were developing 
and advancing ‘concept modelers’ as they were called at the time. 
Specifically, these were 3D printers that kept the focus on improving 
concept development and functional prototyping, that were being 
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developed specifically as office- and user-friendly, cost-effective systems; 
the prelude to today’s desktop machines. However, these systems were all 
still very much for industrial applications.185 
The separation between high- and low-end machines in the late 1990s was critical 
to the current additive manufacturing landscape. The research into the development and 
output of high-end additive manufacturing machines continued along a relatively constant 
and predictable trajectory. The mere cost of these high-end machines (more than 
$500,000) made them inaccessible to the average consumer, limiting exposure and 
investments to large companies or governments—a pattern that still exists today.186 
While significant advancements have been made in the more sophisticated sector of 
additive manufacturing, the path to achieve those innovations has been much different 
than that of the low-end sector.  
Advancements in technologies required for the low-end additive manufacturing 
machines led to surprising industry changes. After nearly two decades of a strict 
industrial focus, the personal 3D printing “revolution” started in 2005 with an open-
source project dubbed RepRap.187 The idea behind the RepRap concept was to create a 
machine that could essentially produce its own parts. More importantly, the open-source 
concept meant that many of the ideas, designs, information, and technologies associated 
with this machine ended up in the hands of a much wider audience.188 Tinkerers, 
inventors, and those simply interested in the concept of 3D printing could study, 
experiment, tweak and begin to design their own machines at a very low cost. As a result, 
the first commercially available 3D printer based on the RepRap concept was offered for 
sale in January 2009.189  
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While the RepRap project’s original intent was to promote opportunities for free 
design and foster innovation in a less commercialized environment, the concept produced 
the exact opposite effect.190 As the editors for 3D Printing Industry note, “Since 2009, a 
host of similar deposition printers have emerged with marginal unique selling points 
(USPs) and they continue to do so. The interesting dichotomy here is that, while the 
RepRap phenomenon has given rise to a whole new sector of commercial, entry-level 3D 
printers, the ethos of the RepRap community is all about Open Source developments for 
3D printing and keeping commercialization at bay.”191 By freely handing over the 
designs for this technology to anyone interested, the minds behind the RepRap project 
sent the development of the personal 3D printer on a totally unanticipated trajectory. 
Openly sharing ideas to collectively improve a specific process did little more than lay 
the groundwork for a slate of new patents in personal 3D printing—patents that are, in 
many cases, minor tweaks to existing technologies.192 
Understanding these events’ implications helps inform the current landscape of 
additive manufacturing. On the high-end side, companies continue to invest in pushing 
the boundaries of the most sophisticated additive manufacturing technologies. Specific 
examples of these advancements include innovations in the biomedical arena, national 
security sector, and aerospace sector. Recognizing the market’s potential growth, 
traditional manufacturers of industrial 3D printers are also developing and producing 
their own low-end personal printers. Meanwhile, smaller companies and even individuals 
continue to develop unique, low-end 3D printers claiming similar capability and 
functionality to their superior relatives but with significantly lower starting costs. This is 
only possible due to the varying methods of 3D printing, which are covered in the next 
section of this chapter. While this has had a positive impact on innovation and 
development for the additive manufacturing process, the concept of international 
standardization employed by many traditional sectors remains elusive.193 
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A. METHODS 
This section introduces several popular forms of current additive manufacturing 
processes. It is important to understand there are many different manufacturing processes 
that fall under the umbrella term of additive manufacturing, and while these processes are 
vastly different in complexity, technologies employed, and materials used, the common 
factor is the manner in which production is carried out. Each of the following examples 
involves a device that builds a product from nothing by fusing one layer on top of 
another. This is the key difference between additive manufacturing and traditional 
subtractive manufacturing methods, which begin with a block of material and cut away 
excess material until the desired product is formed.194 
Stereolithography is often described as one of the earliest forms of modern 
additive manufacturing.195 During the 1992 Solid Freeform Fabrication Symposium in 
Austin, Texas, Dr. Paul F. Jacobs, then-director of research and design at 3D Systems in 
Valencia, California, described stereolithography in specific scientific detail.196 For the 
purposes of this paper, a simplified version of the process suffices. First, a 3D rendering 
of the object to be created is sliced into very thin layers using some type of computer-
aided design (CAD) software. That information is then passed to the device that projects 
an intense beam of ultraviolet light into a vat of liquid photopolymer, a substance that 
undergoes a physical or chemical change when exposed to light.197 The beam of 
ultraviolet traces a pattern in the vat of liquid according to each layer being transmitted 
via the CAD software, solidifying the liquid photopolymer as it makes each pass. Each 
cross section that has hardened is then lowered into the remaining liquid photopolymer 
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and the process continues, layer by layer, until the product is complete.198 The diagram in 
Figure 4 visualizes this process. 
Figure 4.  Process of Stereolithography 
 
From 3D Printing Industry. “3D Printing Processes: The Free Beginners Guide.” 
Accessed May 13, 2015. http://3dprintingindustry.com/3d-printing-basics-free-beginners-
guide/processes/. 
Similar to stereolithography, digital light processing (DLP), uses a light source to 
create layers within a vat of photopolymers (see Figure 5). The significant difference 
between the two methods is the source of light. While stereolithography uses an 
ultraviolet light to trace a pattern in a vat of liquid photopolymers, digital light processing 
uses a more conventional light source, such as an arc lamp.199 The light source is 
reflected off a series of mirrors and into a lens that causes patterns to cure in the source 
material. Objects are then either lowered into or raised out of the vat of photopolymers to 
make room for the next layer. While very similar to stereolithography, digital light 
processing usually has faster build times, as this technique can create an entire layer in 
one singular digital image versus the tracing of a focused beam of ultraviolet light as 
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described for stereolithography.200 In addition, since both techniques use similar 
materials, the inherent strengths and weaknesses of each process are the same.201 
Figure 5.  Process of Digital Light Processing 
 
From 3D Printing Industry. “3D Printing Processes: The Free Beginners Guide.” 
Accessed May 13, 2015. http://3dprintingindustry.com/3d-printing-basics-free-beginners-
guide/processes/. 
Selective laser sintering, however, is a completely different method of additive 
manufacturing. Unlike stereolithography or digital light processing, selective laser 
sintering does not use a liquid photopolymer, but instead uses a bed of powdered polymer 
as its building material. A high-powered laser interacts with the surface of the powdered 
material and either sinters (the heat applied is below the particles’ boiling point) or melts 
(the heat applied is above the particles’ boiling point) the particles together into a solid 
layer.202 As each layer is fused, the powder bed is dropped incrementally to create room 
for the next layer. As this occurs, a roller within the device levels the surface of the 
remaining powder bed to prepare for the next layer.203 See Figure 6 for the visualized 
process. Selective laser sintering gives the user many more options for building materials 
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than stereolithography or digital light processing. This process has been used to 
successfully created objects using plastics, glass, metal, and even ceramics.204 
Figure 6.  Process of Selective Laser Sintering 
 
From 3D Printing Industry. “3D Printing Processes: The Free Beginners Guide.” 
Accessed May 13, 2015. http://3dprintingindustry.com/3d-printing-basics-free-beginners-
guide/processes/. 
Fused deposition modeling is the most affordable 3D printing process and, as 
such, it is also the most common additive manufacturing process.205 This method is also 
one of the simplest, involving a relatively limited number of parts. The process involves 
begins as two separate materials are fed into a heated extrusion head.206 The primary 
material is the plastic filament used to create the final product and the secondary material 
is required to support the model as it is being created. As the materials enter the heated 
extrusion head, they become pliable. They are then deposited layer by layer in ribbons 
roughly the size of a human hair.207 Once the object has been completed, the support 
materials are simply separated from the object and disposed of, leaving only the 
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completed project. While simple in comparison to others, this method of additive 
manufacturing often requires much longer build times. Given the limited nature of 
materials available for this process, the types of objects it can create is also limited. 
Figure 7.  Process of Fused Deposition Modeling 
 
From 3D Printing Industry. “3D Printing Processes: The Free Beginners Guide.” 
Accessed May 13, 2015. http://3dprintingindustry.com/3d-printing-basics-free-beginners-
guide/processes/. 
These methods are only four of many in the additive manufacturing industry. 
Internet sites such as Sculpteo and 3D Printing Industry list more than twice as many. 
With so many existing methods, advances in the myriad of technologies they use could 
change the entire landscape of the industry. For example, as noted previously, fused 
deposition modeling is currently the most popular form of 3D printing due to its ease of 
use and lower costs, but it is also has the most limited outputs. This also means that most 
individuals with 3D printers are somewhat limited in what they can create. Imagine if 
someone were able to develop an extrusion head that could heat and accurately deposit 
metals, glass, or other materials using the same basic design as the current low-cost 
printers. Suddenly, more consumers could have access to devices with much different 
capabilities. There are already several hobbyists working on creating very powerful 3D 
 60 
printers in their private garages.208 Any one of these attempts could not only 
revolutionize the industry, but also force those outside of the industry to consider a new, 
widespread device’s implications. 
B. DRIVERS 
Similar to the drivers identified in the ongoing enhancement of UAS technology, 
certain groups’ activities and interests will drive maturation in low-end additive 
manufacturing products, while others will force the high-end, more sophisticated 
technologies to evolve. Improvements to the high-end systems will continue to be driven 
by stakeholders who can afford to invest in these already expensive systems. With a 
myriad of potential uses, the U.S. military continues to invest significant resources in the 
future application of additive manufacturing processes.209 Using proven additive 
manufacturing techniques, military scientists are already designing and constructing 
items for personnel use, such as parts for protective masks, medical prosthetics, and 
custom holders for bomb-detecting equipment.210 3D printers have also been deployed to 
the field in Afghanistan to help troops produce small parts on demand. The ultimate goal 
of many of these scientists, however, is not simply to master current additive 
manufacturing processes, but to create new processes that continue to push the limits of 
the technology. As Jaret Riddick, leader of the Army Research Laboratory’s Structural 
integrity and Durability Team, notes, “The desire here is to take this very new sort of 
technique, additive manufacturing or 3-D printing, that’s normally been used for 
prototyping, and use it to actually manufacture functioning parts. There’s a lot that needs 
to be understood at the very fundamental level to be able to make that leap.”211 The U.S. 
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military—hoping to one day be able to print food, skin, and even warheads—will 
continue to push advances in additive manufacturing processes.212 
Unlike the other identified drivers, the medical sector is in a somewhat unique 
position: it is already capitalizing on enhancements to both high-end and low-end 
additive manufacturing technologies and, as such, continues to invest resources in both. 
On the more sophisticated side of the scale, medical researchers are pushing current 
technology to create models of internal human vascular networks, and to make safer and 
cheaper pharmaceuticals.213 Innovation on this front is occurring so rapidly that tasks 
once thought impossible now seem almost commonplace. Just a few years ago, using 
additive manufacturing technologies to help bones heal properly was considered 
revolutionary. Today, a similar story would not make most medical blogs. In just one 
month of reports on 3D Printing.com’s medical archive blog, there are examples of 
researchers using 3D printing technology to create human cartilage implants, develop 
scaffolds to potentially cure Type-1 diabetes, and even create the world’s first 3D printed 
beating artificial heart cells.214 But not all innovation has to be so complex. Researchers 
and physicians are also using less capable machines to provide medical aid such as 
custom splits and prosthetics.215 However, with goals to eventually print fully functional 
human organs, the medical industry will play a significant role in driving additive 
manufacturing innovation.216 
Finally, similar to the identified drivers of UAS technological innovation, 
tinkerers will also play a role in future additive manufacturing enhancements. More so 
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than the previous technologies addressed in this paper, private individuals have openly 
embraced this role in non-traditional ways. Mark Hatch, the chief executive officer 
(CEO) of TechShop, a membership-based, do-it-yourself, open-access, fabrication 
workspace claims that the United States is just beginning to enter into what has been 
dubbed the Maker Movement.217 As the name indicates, this movement is focused on 
tinkerers’ desire to create physical objects and, according to Hatch, several factors make 
the present better than any time in history for this movement to occur: “Cheap, powerful, 
and easy-to-use tools play an important role. Easier access to knowledge, capital, and 
markets also help push the revolution.”218 A key element of this revolution is a 
“makerspace,” a physical location with a myriad of tools appropriate for simply building 
things. Of the list of necessary tools for a successful makerspace, Hatch identifies 3D 
printers, scanners, and related software.219 While individuals use the additive 
manufacturing technology to build other objects, they are also becoming familiar enough 
with the technology itself to develop their own enhancements. The Maker Movement is 
but one way, albeit a significant one, that private individuals will continue to drive 
innovation in additive manufacturing from the bottom up. 
C. PUBLIC POLICY 
During his 2013 State of the Union Address, President Obama stated, “Last year, 
we created our first manufacturing innovation institute in Youngstown, Ohio. A once-
shuttered warehouse is now a state-of-the art lab where new workers are mastering the 
3D printing that has the potential to revolutionize the way we make almost everything. 
There’s no reason this can’t happen in other towns.”220  
When the President of the United States of America made it a point to mention an 
emerging technology in the State of the Union Address, one might have assumed actions 
                                                 
217 Mark Hatch, The Maker Manifesto (New York: McGraw Hill, 2014), 3. 
218 Ibid., 5. 
219 Ibid., 24. 
220 President Barack Obama, “2013 State of the Union Address,” White House Office of the Press 
Secretary, February 2013, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/remarks-president-
state-union-address. 
 63 
to determine the potential public policy implications of said technology were well 
underway. In the case of additive manufacturing, this was far from the case. Contrary to 
the ease at which President Obama stated this technology could spread to “other towns,” 
the one element that could certainly inhibit the further proliferation of an emerging 
technology is its mismanagement in public policy. 
The reference to 3D printing in Obama’s 2013 speech was a bit of a misstatement. 
His comment was intended to highlight the potential benefits advancements in the field of 
additive manufacturing could bring to the manufacturing sector in the United States, 
which has struggled to compete globally over the past several decades.221 Since different 
methods of additive manufacturing have been employed to some degree in the U.S. 
manufacturing sector since the 1970s, there have been limited considerations to the 
impact these technologies could have on public policy, and vice versa.222 The President 
was not referencing the sudden and drastic increase in the use of personal 3D printers 
within the last five years—often a point of confusion due to the inconsistencies in sector-
specific nomenclature previously discussed in this paper. Academic research on the role 
of public policy and regulation as it pertains to these latest trends in personal 3D printing 
has been somewhat scarce and seemingly reactionary, focused on addressing the most 
immediate issues raised by a technology that is changing faster than legislators’ pens. The 
majority of current public policy discourse can be placed into one of four overarching 
categories: copyright and intellectual property rights, economic implications, individual 
liability concerns, and gun control. Two of these topics have at least managed to initiate 
some level of national level dialogue: copyright considerations and gun control.  
3D printing’s impact on copyright and intellectual property rights is currently 
receiving significant attention via corporate sponsored research and academia. This is of 
little surprise, as traditional views on issues pertaining to copyrights, patents, industrial 
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designs, and trademarks are at risk of being upended by 3D printing technologies.223 
Designs that were once tightly controlled by the private sector are now at risk of being 
easily, and relatively cheaply, reproduced by the consumer. Products that cost companies 
millions in research and design, marketing, and delivery can now be replicated for very 
little once in the hands of the general population. Makerbot, a company that sells 3D 
printers, provides a current example of what the future might hold. Markerbot also runs 
Thingiverse—a website on which individuals share their designs for 3D printers.224 
While the company touts the site as a way to promote open sharing of 3D designs 
amongst hobbyists, many of the items on the site are actually protected by copyright.225 
Current 3D printing technology has already enabled those with modest 3D printers to 
replicate, reproduce, and share the designs for copyrighted material, and this trend will 
only continue as the related technologies enable increased sophistication.    
To further complicate these issues, while copyright and intellectual property right 
legislation is relatively sophisticated in the United States, laws often do not transcend 
national boundaries. Due to issues of national sovereignty, differing political systems, 
and cultural traditions, there has never been a universal international copyright law:226 
“The Berne Convention and the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIP) Agreement attempt to harmonize copyright laws around the world, but these 
multilateral conventions have yet to create a uniform intellectual property regime under 
which all member countries have identical copyright laws.”227 The complications brought 
to the debate by the mere global characteristics of the Internet suggests no universal 
agreement will be made on these issues in the near future.  
                                                 
223 Nathan Schissel, “3D Printing and Implications on Intellectual Property Rights,” Technology Law 
Advisor, November 10, 2014, http://technologylawadvisor.com/3d-printing-and-implications-on-
intellectual-property-rights/.  
224 Steve Henn, “As 3-D Printing Becomes More Accessible, Copyright Questions Arise,” NPR, 
February 19, 2013, http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2013/02/19/171912826/as-3-d-printing-
become-more-accessible-copyright-questions-arise.  
225 Ibid. 
226 Peter K. Yu, “Conflict of Laws Issues in International Copyright Cases,” GigaLaw. April 2001. 
http://www.peteryu.com/gigalaw0401.pdf. 
227 Ibid.  
 65 
While some predict that, if not appropriately addressed via legislation, copyright 
infringement could have devastating effects on the future of many private sector 
companies within the United States, others have offered a different perspective. Michael 
Weinberg, a lawyer for an open-Internet advocacy group, argues it is the private sector 
that needs to adapt. Weinberg states, “The technology is coming whether we like it or 
not. And so as a CEO of one of these companies, you can spend a lot of time and money 
trying to sue it out of existence—and sue the genie back into the bottle—or you can 
spend that same time and money and apply it toward finding a way to use the technology 
to your advantage.”228 Individual lawsuits notwithstanding, the private sector will need 
support from well-informed policymakers as the implications of these changes have a 
direct impact on the U.S. economy as well.  
Of the categories highlighted in this section, the role of 3D printing in gun control 
has been the most prominent in popular press. The U.S. gun control debate is both 
popular and divisive, so it comes as no surprise the popular media would focus on this 
particular aspect of modern 3D printing.229 In 2012, following some of the worst gun-
related violence in U.S. history, Defense Distributed gained national notoriety for 
developing an untraceable AR15 receiver that could be created entirely on a 3D 
printer.230 In direct defiance to several state laws banning high-capacity magazines in 
assault rifles, Defense Distributed placed these designs on the Internet to be freely 
downloaded.231  
While Defense Distributed pushed the legal envelope with their untraceable AR15 
receivers and high capacity magazines, it was Cody Wilson’s Liberator, a plastic gun that 
can be produced entirely in a 3D printer, that finally forced the federal government to 
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take notice. In April 2013, reacting to Wilson and Defense Distributed, Senator Steve 
Israel introduced a bill that sought to overhaul the Undetectable Firearms Act (UFA) of 
1988 to include specific provisions targeting 3D printed weapons.232 Israel noted, “When 
I started talking about the issue of completely plastic firearms, I was told the idea of a 
plastic gun is science fiction. That science fiction is now a dangerous reality.”233 Even 
with a Republican co-sponsoring the bill, strong opposition from the National Rifle 
Association (NRA) and lukewarm support from gun control advocates essentially killed 
Israel’s proposals.234 The UFA of 1988 was renewed for another decade but no additional 
considerations for the implications of 3D printed guns were made. Sadly, many believe it 
will take more than Israel’s efforts for legislators to finally address the issues. As Israel 
suggested, “A single, real-world incident involving those potentially deadly weapons 
would bring them back into the spotlight.”235 
D. SUMMARY 
As this chapter has highlighted, comparatively little has been done via policy to 
address the known issues pertaining to additive manufacturing (see Table 4). Despite 
concerns surrounding the development of illicit weaponry and known copyright issues, 
additive manufacturing policy has gained little traction at the national level. Similar to the 
unexpected proliferation of UASs, the use of additive manufacturing technology; namely 
the personal 3D printer, has drastically increased over the last five years. With this trend 
only expected to continue, policymakers need to address these known issues while also 
collaborating with appropriate stakeholders to identify unknown issues.  
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Table 4.   Additive Manufacturing Policy Summary 
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VI. FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS 
The comparative study of unmanned aerial systems (UAS), autonomous vehicles, 
and additive manufacturing offers interesting insight into the processes behind and the 
development—or lack thereof—of informed public policy. Evidence suggests factors that 
typically aid in this public policy development, such as direct government involvement in 
the creation and evolution of a given technology, did not have the anticipated effects. In 
fact, the evidence suggests the characteristics of the technology itself have more to do 
with whether or not legislators are prepared for its emergence.  
A. FINDINGS 
Based on the examples covered in this paper, the following characteristics can be 
found in an emerging technology more likely to surprise policymakers: the technology 
evolves quickly; it has a low price point for entry; and the impacted stakeholders cross 
industries or sectors. 
(1) Technology Evolves Quickly 
UAS—While modern UASs have been used by the military since before the 
Vietnam War, the rapid advancements in technology since their adoption by the private 
sector have been incredible. Cameras have become smaller, lighter, and yet more capable 
than ever. Batteries have also become smaller and more powerful, enabling longer flight 
times for devices. More advanced GPS and computer technology also give the private 
sector and private citizens access to technology that was once reserved for sophisticated 
military operations.  
Autonomous Vehicles—Inventors, automobile companies, and academia have 
been working to develop and improve the autonomous vehicle since the 1930s. With the 
focus changing from the vehicle to the road, and then back to the vehicle again, this 
technology’s evolution has been relatively slow. Although advancements in the past 
decade have provided for more rapid advancements, it will still be at least a decade 
before the technology can be introduced to the public at large. 
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Additive Manufacturing—Much like UASs, modern additive manufacturing 
practices go back decades, but the explosion of low-end 3D printing technologies in the 
past decade caught many by surprise. Both high-end 3D systems and low-end 3D printers 
are increasing in their capabilities and sophistication quite rapidly, especially in the field 
of medicine and biotech. 
(2) Technology Has a Low Price Point for Entry 
UAS—For the private sector and the individual, the price point for entry into this 
market continues to decline while the devices’ capabilities increase. Cameras, GPS, and 
batteries are more capable than ever but are also less expensive. A decent UAS for 
private use is now a fraction of the cost of previous versions and can be purchased from 
many different vendors. 
Autonomous Vehicle—The price for the technology necessary to build an 
autonomous vehicle is still incredibly complicated and expensive. The myriad of sensors 
necessary to operate the autonomous vehicles is estimated between $75,000-$100,000.236 
This means further technological advancement will primarily originate with private sector 
companies or the government. 
Additive Manufacturing—As more individuals obtain the technology and more 
refinements are made, there are continually more options for the low-end 3D printers. At 
the same time, established companies producing high-end 3D systems have also begun 
developing their low-end counterparts, increasing competition and continuing to drive 
down costs.  
(3) Technology Stakeholders Cross Industries or Sectors 
UAS—Because of the wide range of potential uses for the technology, the 
development of informed policy for incorporating UASs into the national airspace 
requires input from a myriad of stakeholders including the FAA, DOJ, DHS, state 
representatives, the law enforcement community, the private sector, and private citizens. 
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Each of these groups presents a separate set of challenges that must be considered when 
addressing the ways in which this technology will be implemented domestically. 
Autonomous Vehicle—The policy implications for the incorporation of 
autonomous vehicles onto public roads directly impacts NHTSA, individual state 
representatives, and the few private sector companies with vested interests in this 
technology’s future. Relatively speaking, the group required for coordinating solid policy 
measures is small when compared to other emerging technologies.  
Additive Manufacturing—There are many industries heavily invested in this 
technology at present, and to the number will only increase as additive manufacturing 
becomes more sophisticated. As this paper illustrates, there are clear implications to our 
legal system regarding copyright issues, the medical sector, homeland security, national 
security, law enforcement community, and the private sector, to include the private 
citizen.  
B. FINDINGS SUMMARY 
Despite indications that its public availability is still at least a decade away, the 
findings of this research suggest that public policy regulating autonomous vehicles to 
U.S. public roads is more mature than that of UASs or additive manufacturing. The most 
significant indicator for this conclusion is the legislative posture of policymakers when 
addressing issues raised by these emerging technologies. In the case of UASs, for 
example, state-level legislative bodies are primarily reactive, focused on passing policy to 
curtail a specific issue or activity after it occurs. In the case of additive manufacturing, 
what little legislation has been proposed has also focused on eliminating an activity’s 
product after the activity has occurred, such as 3D printed guns or issues with copyright 
violations. The environment in which policies are being created for autonomous vehicles 
is much different. While NHTSA, the lead federal agency for this effort, has not released 
official legislation, it has developed a series of recommendations for states looking to 
draft their own technology-related policies. This suggests that while NHTSA is already 
considering the implications this technology could have in the future, it has been careful 
to not overreact with unnecessary regulation of its own. As noted, a slowly evolving 
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technology, a high price point for entry, and a somewhat limited stakeholder group are all 
factors that enable policymakers to address concerns raised by autonomous vehicles in a 
much more concerted effort than those forced to address UASs or additive 
manufacturing.  
It is also important to note that, of all the elements introduced in this paper, the 
one that separates the development of public policy for autonomous vehicles from the 
others is the level of government engagement with private sector stakeholders and 
academia. From the DARPA-sponsored challenge races, which linked U.S. military 
sponsors with academics, to Google representatives’ direct involvement in Nevada 
legislation, the private sector has worked much closer with policymakers on issues 
related to autonomous vehicles than either UAS or additive manufacturing to date. In 
fact, this author was unable to locate significant data on any public-private partnerships 
focused on either UASs or additive manufacturing policy issues. As a result of the private 
sector-academia partnership, autonomous vehicles are receiving a measured and 
thoughtful level of policy consideration at a critical juncture in their continued 
development. While essentially still a patchwork of policies with varying degrees of 
sophistication, states are proposing bills that generally align with federal guidance and 
future concerns, rather than merely creating reactionary measures that attempt to address 
an emerging technology’s latest crisis. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The influence of public policy on emerging technologies is complex. As examples 
in this paper illustrate, reactionary policy created to address one concern posed by an 
emerging technology can not only change the trajectory of that technology, but also often 
creates other unanticipated outcomes. The mere characteristics of an emerging 
technology, such as its complexity, ambiguity, and unpredictability, make a proper 
assessment process more difficult for policymakers, though not impossible.237 What 
lessons learned from the study of public policy development for UASs and autonomous 
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vehicles can be applied in an effort to assist stakeholders in the future of additive 
manufacturing?  
There are two approaches to this question: a strategic approach, which focuses on 
broad themes and general recommendations, and a tactical approach, which proposes 
specific actions stakeholders could take to better prepare for technology implementation. 
1. Strategic 
First, organizations need to engage as early in the process as possible. When 
discussing the concerns raised by nano-technology, authors Haico te Kulve and Arie Rip 
note, “Engagement is often organized only after a particular issue has emerged, when it 
may be too late to make a difference.”238 The FAA’s refusal to update its Model Aircraft 
Operating Standards is a good example of an organization that simply waited too long to 
engage stakeholders. With related technologies accelerating all around them, the original 
advisory quickly became obsolete. Rather than engaging appropriate stakeholders to 
ensure the policy was consistently updated, the FAA simply ignored it; resultantly, the 
technology far exceeded the scope of the policy by the time it was revisited. Popular 
associations, such as the Academy of Model Aeronautics, have not only subject-matter 
expertise from all over the world, but also an interest in appropriate public policy for their 
craft.239 These organizations could have been valuable resources in ensuring this 
particular policy kept up with emerging technology.  
Second, especially when interested in emerging technologies, organizations 
should engage with non-traditional stakeholders. This is not to suggest that the floodgates 
should open to all parties interested in a particular topic; there is an important science 
involved in selecting the appropriate audience to include in early engagement activities. 
This is especially true of emerging technologies that can be significantly impacted by any 
small shift in policy or legislation. An increased awareness of actors’ roles and influences 
should be closely examined before they are included in discussion. As Kulve and Rip 
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conclude, “It is thus clear that, although important, more is involved than willingness to 
enter into a dialogue (or multilogue) with other actors. The propensities to be assessed 
play a role in the further development and societal embedding of technologies.”240 
Third, organizations should cultivate policy entrepreneurs.241 Addressing the need 
for organizations to stimulate individuals to focus on policy issues, Jonathan B. Wiener 
of Duke University School of Law further explains this concept by describing policy 
entrepreneurs as individuals who “will develop and test new forms and approaches to 
regulation for greater effectiveness, less cost, less caustic side effects, and other desirable 
attributes.”242 This novel approach to public policy development suggests that 
organizations should identify internal assets to focus on and actually test proposed 
regulations. This approach would draw on internal organizational subject-matter expertise 
to help policymakers identify potentially unforeseen issues with multiple policy 
scenarios. This policy “test-bed” would enable policymakers to choose one proposal, or 
an individual element of multiple proposals, to ensure the final product is the best overall 
approach to a given issue. 
2. Tactical 
DHS has mechanisms currently in place that, if appropriately utilized, could help 
policymakers understand the potential implications of additive manufacturing and other 
emerging technologies in the United States. By tapping into these existing resources, the 
Department could quickly generate a body of knowledge designed to address current gaps 
in policy, knowledge, and understanding.  
DHS should partner with academic institutions via the DHS Science and 
Technology Directorate Office’s (S&T) Centers of Excellence (COE) to focus on issues 
related to additive manufacturing. The COE network includes hundreds of universities 
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funded by DHS to conduct research addressing homeland security challenges.243 Outside 
of academia, the COE network also includes partners in industry, national laboratories, 
federal agencies, state, local, tribal, and territorial homeland security agencies, and even 
first responders. According to S&T, these partners, “work in concert to develop critical 
technologies and analyses to secure the nation.”244 Issues identified by DHS or its 
partners can be proposed for study, and awards in the form of research funding can be 
allocated accordingly. Given the potential—but at this point unclear—impact additive 
manufacturing could have on the homeland security environment over the next 5–10 
years, it would certainly be an appropriate topic for a COE initiative.  
DHS is currently responsible for another initiative, which could be used either 
directly or as a model, to identify ways in which additive manufacturing could impact 
homeland security. FEMA’s Office of Program and Policy Analysis (OPPA) develops the 
Strategic Foresight Initiative (SFI) Report. The SFI, which is currently run every five 
years, is essentially a horizon-scanning effort for the emergency management 
community. It has worked to gather information on potential trends that could impact the 
field of emergency management in the next 15–30 years, and does so by working with 
subject-matter experts in emergency management community and first responders at the 
federal, state, local, and tribal levels, as well as partners in academia and the private 
sector.245 The SFI identifies technology as a significant driver of change within the 
emergency management discipline, but the report’s focus is high level and does not 
discuss the intricacies of specific technologies. 
While this type of report is valuable for long-term planning considerations, the 
process of polling industry experts to determine issues for further research is even more 
valuable for short-term issues. Aharon Hauptman and Yair Sharan, researchers at the 
Interdisciplinary Center for Technology Analysis and Forecasting (ICTAF) in Tel-Aviv, 
Israel, used a similar process to examine the potential threats posed by emerging 
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technologies in 2013. They surveyed over 500 recognized experts on issues related to the 
threat potential of 33 identified technologies.246 The results of the study provide an entire 
menu of topics for anyone interested in addressing emerging technology issues. As 
Hauptman and Sharan note, “The presented process could serve as a basis for a kind of 
early warning system on emerging threats, which could help coping with them in advance 
and thus to minimize surprises.”247 What could policymakers want more than to 
minimize surprise? 
D. CONCLUSION 
As this thesis shows, finding the appropriate legislative balance when addressing 
emerging technologies is difficult at best. Reactionary overregulation, which many feared 
would be applied to additive manufacturing technologies following the successful testing 
of Defense Distributed’s Liberator, could negatively impact the technology’s future by 
stifling innovation or driving its development elsewhere. Conversely, inadequate policy 
can create confusion among a technology’s users, which can lead to dangerous operating 
environments. As noted, it was the absence of FAA policy related to commercial UAS 
operators that created a potentially dangerous situation between a commercial operator at 
Falcon UAV and emergency responders in Colorado. While legislative perfection is 
highly unlikely, avoiding policy-development extremes could drastically improve 
regulatory overreaction to emerging technologies. 
Of the three examples covered in this paper, the approach taken for the 
development of policy for the continued testing of autonomous vehicles on public roads 
has been the most successful. To date, it serves as a good example of policy developed 
from an open partnership between the government and private sector. Furthermore, while 
the lead federal agency impacted by this technology has an acknowledged appreciation 
for the potential implications of autonomous vehicles, it has been careful not to burden 
the continued evolution via unnecessary regulation.   
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Similar to the UAS policy approach, the current state of policy development 
concerning additive manufacturing technologies appears to be overly reactionary. At the 
height of the controversy surrounding Defense Distributed, discussions were ongoing at 
the federal level regarding legislation that could have seriously restricted the future 
development of the personal 3D printer. While that legislation never passed, 
policymakers’ approach should concern both those who would like to see increased 
regulation in the industry as well as those who want less regulation. The knee-jerk 
legislation and subsequent inaction suggests there is both a lack of understanding and 
appreciation for the potential implications of additive manufacturing technologies across 
different industries and sectors. While relatively little policy is currently under 
consideration, a single significant event could catalyze extreme legislative restriction, 
swinging the pendulum from non-existent policy to overregulation. 
Is additive manufacturing a homeland security concern? Many experts believe, 
because of its potential for abuse and the ease with which it can be acquired, additive 
manufacturing is very much a homeland security concern.248 The implications of these 
technologies are not exclusive to the field homeland security, however, so the solution 
space is not solely occupied by the homeland security community. As the 
recommendations proposed in this paper suggest, the homeland security community 
should be one stakeholder in a larger discussion addressing the ways in which these 
technologies can be exploited without sacrificing public safety. Several mechanisms are 
currently in place to foster this dialogue and must simply be directed to do so. Only with 
increased awareness and communication among appropriate stakeholders can 
policymakers appropriately address additive manufacturing concerns and avoid the 
legislative pitfalls so commonly associated with emerging technologies. 
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